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I. INTRODUCTION
Public employees in Ohio are now statutorily entitled to bargain
collectively with their government employers. This controversial right
was obtained on July 6, 1983, when Ohio Governor Richard Celeste
fulfilled a major campaign promise by signing into law Senate Bill
133. This bill, which took effect April 1, 1984, has been labeled
"one of the most pro-labor public employee bargaining statutes in
the nation."'
As with any legislation that provides sweeping social and economic
changes, challenges to the bill's legitimacy can be expected. Ex-
perience in other states teaches that constitutional attacks on the
statute will be mounted swiftly, attacks that undoubtedly will allege
the bill contains an unconstitutional delegation of legislative author-
ity, does not comply with the requisites of procedural due process,
and is a violation of the home rule provisions of the state
constitution. 2
* Associate with the Cincinnati law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl; J.D., University of
Kentucky, 1981.
* * Associate with the Cincinnati law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl; J.D., University of
Virginia, 1979.
*** Partner with the Cincinnati law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl; J.D., University of
Kentucky, 1972.
1. J. LEwis & S. SPIRN, OHIO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW 3 (1983). This label
undeniably is correct. For a discussion of the bill's provisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 15-52.
2. A challenge to the bill on "home rule" grounds may presently be in the works.
Several Ohio mayors have hinted publicly of their intent to attack the statute as violative
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This Article analyzes the ways these issues have been handled
by out-of-state courts and suggests their proper resolution by the
courts of Ohio. It begins by tracing the development of public
employee bargaining and by detailing the checkered history such
bargaining efforts have had in Ohio. It next provides an overview
of Senate Bill 133, focusing on those provisions likely to come under
constitutional attack. It then examines out-of-state authority for
guidelines on how Ohio can and should deal with these constitu-
tional questions. On an issue-by-issue basis, a framework for resolv-
ing these questions is supplied.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Unlike those persons employed by private employers, public
employees only somewhat recently are securing collective bargain-
ing rights. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which pro-
tects concerted activities of private workers, does not extend to public
employees.3 Apd while various attempts have been made to amend
the NLRA to cover state and local governments, those efforts have
not succeeded. 4 Collective bargaining rights for state and local
government employees thus remain in the hands of the individual
states.
Wisconsin, in 1959, became the first state to recognize collective
bargaining rights for its public employees. 5 But it was President Ken-
nedy's executive order, acknowledging federal employees' right to
unionize and the corresponding right of their employers to recognize
unions, that stimulated the growth of public sector bargaining. 6 A
public employer, however, has no duty to bargain with its
of the home rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution. See 21 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
at 1465 (luly 18, 1983).
3. Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the term "employer" does not
include a state or political subdivision thereof. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
4. H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 1335 (1977); H.R. 9730, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 27,062 (1973). Additionally, in 1976, the Democratic
platform endorsed a public employee bargaining law. See National Journal, Jan. 8, 1977,
Vol 9, No. 2, at 69.
Any serious effort to extend the NLRA to the states, of course, would confront the
potential roadblock of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (exten-
sion of Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local government employees held to violate
tenth amendment).
5. 1959 Wis. Laws ch. 509, § 1 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. 111.70-.71 (West
1974)).
6. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962). The courts soon thereafter added
impetus to the movement by holding protected by the first amendment a public employee's
right to join a union. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
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employees. 7 Thus, despite the workers' right to unionize, bargain-
ing rights for state and local employees exist only if the governmen-
tal unit so decrees.
During the late 1960's and the 1970's, numerous states decided
in favor of granting their workers the right to bargain collectively.
By 1977, eighteen states had provided comprehensive bargaining
rights to their employees, 8 and by 1983, approximately one half of
the states had passed comprehensive public employee bargaining
statutes. 9 A total of thirty-seven states, moreover, had in place
bargaining laws for at least some of their employees at the time
Senate Bill 133 was passed.10 Ohio, in 1983, was thus relatively late
in recognizing public employee bargaining. Until the bill's passage,
Ohio had not provided employees with any statutory bargaining
rights, and its Ferguson Act expressly forbade strikes by public
employees. 1
The state's late entry into the foray was not from lack of effort.
Three previous attempts to enact such legislation had failed, two
by vetoes of then-Governor James A. Rhodes.12 Thus, when Gover-
nor Celeste took office with the promise of a public bargaining bill,
7. See Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315 v. Smith, 441 U.S. 463 (1979)
(per curiam).
8. Associated Press, Feb. 20, 1977. A "comprehensive" bargaining law is one that
applies to most, if not all, public employees.
9. Drachman & Dohrman, Labor and Employment Law, 1983 A.B.A. COMMITTEE
REPORTS 398.
10. See 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 1464 (July 18, 1983). Illinois, moreover,
enacted a comprehensive public employee bargaining law subsequent to Ohio. 4 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) SLL 23:215 (1983) (discussing Illinois Labor Relations Act P.A. 1012,
§§ 1-27) (effective July 1, 1984)). Thus, 39 states now provide bargaining rights to at
least some employees.
It has been asserted that comprehensive bargaining laws are more likely to be found
in those states having (1) relatively higher per capita expenditures by state government,
(2) relatively larger changes in per capita income and (3) relatively more innovative state
legislatures. R. ALLEN & T. KEAVENY, CONTEMPORARY LABOR RELATIONs 587 (1983).
11. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01-.05 (Page 1980) (repealed 1983). The absence
of a statute, however, did not prevent collective bargaining by some employees. In Dayton
Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714
(1975), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that school boards, if they wish, may bargain
collectively, overruling the long-standing precedent of Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147
Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947), which had disapproved public sector bargaining.
Indeed, over one-half of Ohio's public employees reportedly are already union members,
and many have engaged in collective bargaining. See 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
at 1464 (July 18, 1983).
12. 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 1464 (July 18, 1983). Moreover, the legisla-
tion proposed in 1977, S. 222, 112th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1977-78), was strik-
ingly similar to the present bill. For a discussion of the provisions of Senate Bill 222,
see Note, Collective Bargaining in Ohio's Public Sector: The Blueprint of Senate Bill 222for Con-
structive Labor Relations, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 295 (1977).
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it was a promise that public employees and their unions had long
waited to see realized. 13
Their wait was not a long one. Senate Bill 133, sponsored by
Democrat Eugene Branstool, was approved by the State Senate on
April 21, 1983, and passed the House on June 29, 1983, with various
amendments. The following day, the Senate concurred with the
House amendments, and the bill was signed into law by Governor
Celeste on July 6, 1983.14 Ohio thus became the thirty-eighth state
to offer bargaining rights to public employees. And it did so with
a flourish, enacting an extremely liberal, far-reaching piece of legisla-
tion, indisputably destined to change the nature of the public
employer-public employee relationship throughout the state.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF SENATE BILL 133
In Senate Bill 133 (Act), Ohio has gained one of the strongest
public employee bargaining bills in the country.15 The Act extends
to virtually every public employer in the state, 16 as well as to almost
every public employee. 17 It gives to public employees the right to
unionize and to bargain collectively, and, for most public employees,
it gives a limited right to strike.
13. The wisdom of such a bill in the 1980's is, of course, debatable. A BNA survey
found that in 1981, layoffs of state workers had occurred in 43 states, and in 1982, 44
states had laid off workers by mid-year. Hiring freezes and/or hiring restrictions, moreover,
went into effect in all 50 states in 1982. Special Survey, RIFS, Layoffs and EEO in State
Governments, 2 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 948, reported in Drachman & Dohrman,
Labor and Employment Law, 1983 A.B.A. COMMITTEE REPORTS 453. Arguably, the impact
of such trends will be increased by a securing of collective bargaining rights by state workers.
Ohio's bill, moreover, is expected to cost the state $3.3 million to implement. See 21 Gov'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 1464 (July 18, 1983).
But despite these costs and the potential economic threat posed by the collective bargain-
ing process, public employee unionism undeniably has been sought aggressively by many
workers. Economic issues aside, public employees, like their private counterparts, want
input into the decisionmaking process and a measure of control over the workplace. See
Hagler, The Regional Transportation District Strikes and the Colorado Labor Peace Act: A Study
in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 54 COLO. L. REV. 203, 231 (1983) and the studies cited
therein.
14. The vote on the bill in both houses split strictly along party lines, with not one
Republican voting for its passage. 21 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) at 1464 (July 18,
1983).
15. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-238 to 5-246 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIo REV.
CODE § 4117.01-.23) [hereinafter referred to as the "Act"].
16. Federal government employees, of course, are not covered, nor are municipalities
or townships with populations of less than 5,000. Id. at 5-238 (to be codified at OHIO
REV. CODE § 4117.01(B)).
17. Among those persons excluded are persons holding elective office, members of
the Governor's staff, employees of the General Assembly and of the newly-created State
Employment Relations Board (SERB), court employees, confidential employees, managers
and supervisors. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.01(C)).
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The Act also creates the State Employment Relations Board
(SERB or Board), 18 which is responsible for implementing, ad-
ministering and enforcing the new legislation. This three-member
panel's 19 powers are sweeping, 0 providing the Board with unlimited
discretion in many areas in administering the Act. Additionally,
the state personnel board of review, which hears civil service ap-
peals, is placed under the Board's jurisdiction, making the SERB
the dominant regulatory and hearing agency for personnel matters
in Ohio.2'
In many respects, the Act parallels the NLRA, and it is probable
the federal body of law construing that statute will be used to inter-
pret the often ambiguous provisions of the Ohio law. 22 The Act's
ambiguity makes an analysis of its requirements difficult at this early
stage; thus, this overview must not be read as a definitive guideline
of the Act's requirements.
A. Representation and Organization Rights
under the Act
The Act does not require a public employee to join a union, but
it recognizes his right to do So. 2 3 It also guarantees a public employee
18. Id. at 5-239 (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02).
19. Membership on the SERB is by gubernatorial appointment. Id. (to be codified
at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02(A)). Governor Celeste appointed Theodore Dyke, Helen
Fix and William Sheehan as the first SERB. Chairman Dyke Resigned May 9, 1984.
20. See 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-239 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE
§ 4117.02(C)-(N)), For example, the SERB has authority over hiring, unit determina-
tions, representation questions, unfair labor practices, and promulgation of rules and
regulations.
21. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02(N)).
22. But compare the remarks of Representative Clifton Skeen, Chairman of the Ohio
House Subcommittee on Commerce and Labor, who stated "I'm fairly familiar with the
National Labor Relations Act. There may be some similarities, but I don't think this
bill is in any way modeled after that." United Press International, June 2, 1983.
The authors beg to differ with Representative Skeen, as the Ohio Act is unmistakably
modeled in many significant respects after the NLRA. Compare 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv.
5-238 to 5-246 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REVISED CODE § 4117.01-.23) with 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). Nonetheless, application of NLRA precedent to situations aris-
ing under the Ohio law should not occur blindly. The issues of public sector bargaining
will differ from those arising in the private sector, and sensitivity to these differences is
needed. For a similar viewpoint, see Decker, Pennsylvania's Public Employee Relations Act
(Act 195) andJImpasse-The Public Employer's Right to Make Unilateral Changes in Employment
Conditions, 86 DIcK. L. REV. 1 (1981).
23. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-239 to 5-240 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV.
CODE § 4117.03). The Act specifically forbids a union shop-that is, a situation in which
an employee must join the union as a condition of his employment. Id. at 5-241 (to be
codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.09). It provides, however, for the nonmember's pay-
ment of fees to the union if the collective bargaining agreement so requires. The constitu-
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the right to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid and protection.' '24 What con-
stitutes "concerted activity" is currently a hot topic in the federal
area, 25 and because the term is not defined in the Ohio statute, this
evolving federal law presumably will be used to delineate the
parameters of this right under the Act.
The Act also permits public employees to be represented by an
''employee organization" 
-that is, a union. 26 When a union has
been recognized or certified as an "exclusive representative of the
employees," the employer has a duty to bargain with that union. 27
A union becomes the exclusive representative by demonstrating ma-
jority support, and this showing most often will occur through a
formal election. 28 The SERB is responsible for overseeing the elec-
tion process.
tional implications of such a provision are explored in Robinson v. New Jersey, 547 F.
Supp. 1297, 1298 (D.N.J. 1982), in which the court held unconstitutional a similar provi-
sion in New Jersey's bargaining statute. This issue is presently before the Supreme Court
of the United States for resolution. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks,
685 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1767 (1983).
24. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-239 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
5 4117.03(A)(2)).
25. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360 (U.S. Mar. 21,
1984) (No. 82-960), which defined "concerted activities" as including the assertion by an
individual employee of a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement. See also
Meyer Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1984), in which the Board reversed its long-
standing precedent of Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1974), and held that group
activity, necessary for protection under the statute, will not be presumed.
26. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-238 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
S 4117.01(D) defines "employee organization" as "any labor or bona fide organization in
which public employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with public employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours,
terms and other conditions of employment." The Act offers no guidance as to what con-
stitutes a "bona fide" organization.
27. Id. at 5-240 (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.04(B)). An employer has
no obligation to bargain with a union that has not been certified by the SERB as the
"exclusive representative."
28. An employer is free to recognize voluntarily a union that has submitted "substan-
tial evidence" of majority support. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.05(A)(2)).
As a practical matter, though, employers can be expected to require employee organiza-
tions to demonstrate through a formal election that a majority of employees desires to
be represented by a particular organization. See id. at 5-240 to 5-241 (to be codified at
OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.07) for election procedures, Additionally, when an employer
is guilty of committing unfair labor practices that prevent a "free and untrammelled elec-
tion" and if a union at one time had majority support, the SERB can order a union cer-
tified. Id. at 5-240 (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.07(A)(2)).
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) similarly may require an employer to
bargain if the employer's unfair labor practices preclude a fair election, but the NLRB's
authority to do so arises from case law, not by statute. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel has prompted controversy over whether the NLRB could order
[Vol. 53
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One of the critical issues to be resolved in any representation pro-
ceeding is the appropriateness of the petitioned-for bargaining unit.
In making this determination, the SERB is directed by the Act to
consider a number of factors, factors the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) traditionally has assessed in making unit determina-
tions under federal law.2 9 Like the NLRA, the Ohio Act requires
that the determination specify an appropriate unit, not the most ap-
propriate one. 30
B. The Scope of Collective Bargaining
The Act imposes on a public employer and the certified union
the duty to bargain collectively with each other. While bargaining
is required, neither party is compelled to agree to a proposal or to
make a concession. 31 Bargaining sessions are not open to the public.3 2
The scope of this bargaining duty is markedly unclear. Termed
"one of the more frustrating sections of the Act,' '33 the Ohio law
mandates bargaining with respect to "wages, hours, or terms and
an election in the absence of a showing of majority support. The NLRB believes it can,
but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently disagreed and refused
to enforce the Board's bargaining order. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). The Ohio Act makes clear that such "Gissel-like" bargaining orders can occur
only if the union once had the support of a majority of employers.
29. For example, the SERB must consider the employees' community of interests as
reflected by their wages, hours, type of work and other working conditions. It also must
take into account the employees' desires and the employer's efficiency of operations and
administrative structure. Other factors not listed in the Act may be considered in the SERB's
discretion. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-240 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
S 4117.06(B)). However, certain limitations are placed on the SERB's unit determination
authority. See id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)).
30. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(C)). The Ohio Act expressly
states that the SERB's unit determinations are "final and conclusive and not appealable
to the court." Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(A)). If this provision is
interpreted to prohibit not only direct appeals of unit determinations, but also collateral
appeals in the context of unfair labor practice proceedings, serious constitutional ques-
tions arise. See infra notes 119-36 for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
Under the NLRA, NLRB unit determinations are not appealable immediately to court;
rather, an employer must wait until after the union has been certified and then refuse
to bargain. The employer may then appeal the bargaining order to the courts and raise
the inappropriateness of the unit as a defense to the refusal to bargain charge. See American
Fed. of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) and discussion infra at notes 129-35.
31. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-238, 5-240 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
S 4117.01(G), 4117.04(B)).
32. Id. at 5-241 (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE S 4117.09(A)). This provision
compares favorably to Florida law, which requires "goldfish bowl" bargaining, negotia-
tions open to the public and the press. In at least one case, a radio station broadcast from
the bargaining table. See National Journal, Jan. 8, 1977, Vol 9, No. 2, at 69.
33. J. LEwis & S. SPIRN, supra note 1, at 59.
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other conditions of employment and the continuation, modification,
or deletion of an existing provision of a collective bargaining
agreement. ',34
The Act also sets forth certain subjects that are not bargainable35
and then lists certain subjects over which a public employer may
bargain if it so chooses.3 6 These "permissive" 'Subjects for bargain-
ing are the so-called "management rights." Because it is often dif-
ficult to distinguish between the pure exercise of a "management
right" and "terms and other conditions of employment," questions
will arise over whether a management action is a required, or merely
a permissive, subject of bargaining.
The Act, moreover, specifically states that an employer "is not
required to bargain on subjects reserved to the management and
direction of the governmental unit except as affect wages, hours, terms
and conditions of employment and the continuation, modification, or deletion
of an existing provision of a collective bargaining agreement. ,37 This provi-
sion concerning existing agreements is highly unusual. Any reserved
management right that has been included in any prior agreement
thereafter theoretically could become a compulsory topic for bargain-
ing. If a public employer includes in an agreement a provision simply
restating its statutorily recognized management rights, the employer
arguably becomes obligated to bargain at the next negotiations over
such subjects. In addition, when the exercise of a management right
would affect the employees' wages, hours, or terms and conditions
of employment, and it is hard to contemplate an exercise that would
not, the exercise of that management right ostensibly becomes a
mandatory subject for bargaining. Such a construction of the Act
renders the statute's constitutionality doubtful. 38
The Act requires that every collective bargaining agreement con-
tain a grievance procedure which may, but need not, culminate in
final and binding arbitration. 39 It also requires each collective
bargaining agreement to contain a check-off provision authorizing
the deduction of union dues upon presentation of a written authoriza-
tion by the employee, and payment of fees can be made a condition
34. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-241 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
4117.08(A)).
35. Id. (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.08(B)). These topics relate to civil
service examinations and appointments.
36. Id. (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE 5 4117.08(C)).
37. Id. (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.08(C)) (emphasis added).
38. See infra notes 106-10.
39. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-241 (Baldwin) (to be codified at Omo REV. CODE
S 4117.09(B)(1)).
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of employment. 40 Under the Act, the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement govern the wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment and generally prevail over conflicting provisions of
law. 41
Once the parties agree on a contract, the public employer, within
fourteen days, must submit it, along with a request for implement-
ing funds, to the appropriate legislative body for approval. The
legislative body has thirty days in which to approve or to reject the
submission as a whole. If it rejects the submission, either party may
reopen all or part of the entire agreement.4 2
C. Dispute Resolution Procedures
The Act contains an elaborate and complex system for resolving
negotiation disputes. Taking advantage of its status as a latecomer
to the public employee bargaining process, Ohio has drawn from
virtually every procedure used in other states to compile its com-
plicated dispute resolution procedure. The result is perhaps the most
regulated and precisely timed procedure in the nation.
Ohio's step-by-step procedure involves mediation, fact-finding and
conciliation. For some employees, it provides a right to strike. For
others, it mandates binding arbitration. An outline of the entire
dispute resolution process is beyond the scope of this Article, but
several provisions bear noting. 43
At any time prior to forty-five days before the expiration of an
agreement, the parties may agree upon any procedure to settle
unresolved issues, including binding arbitration. If they do not ar-
rive at a voluntary method for settling disputes, the Act's highly
regimented procedures will apply. 44 Under these procedures, the
SERB will appoint a mediator, and later, a fact-finding panel, to
resolve the disputes. The fact-finding panel makes final recommen-
dations on all unresolved issues. Unless either the union or the
legislative body of the public employer rejects the recommendations
by a three-fifths vote of its total membership, these recommenda-
40. Id. (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE 4117.09(B)(2)).
41. Id. (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE 4117.10(A)). Laws pertaining to civil
rights, affirmative action, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, retire-
ment,. residency requirements and minimal educational requirements under state law per-
taining to public education, however, prevail over conflicting provisions of collective bargain-
ing agreements. Id. (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE 5 4117.10(A)).
42. Id. (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE § 4117.10(B)).
43. See id. at 5-243 to 5-244 (to be codified at OlIo REV. CODE 5 4117.14) for the
dispute resolution procedures.
44. Id. at 5-243 (to be codified at OHio REv. CoDE S 4117.14(C)(1)).
19841
CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW
tions are deemed accepted. If rejected by either side, the SERB
publicizes the panel's recommendations.4 5
After rejection and publication of the panel's recommendations,
public employees, except for a specified list of public health and
safety employees, may strike after giving ten days' notice. 46 Such
strikes may be enjoined only if they create a "clear and present
danger to the health or safety of the public." ,47 Moreover, no strike may
be enjoined for more than sixty days. 48
Those employees denied the right to strike are subject to binding
interest arbitration of their disputes. A conciliator holds a hearing
and considers each party's final offer.4 9 The dispute is resolved by
a conciliator selecting, on an issue-by-issue basis, the last best offer
of one of the parties. In making his decision, the conciliator is bound
to consider a list of statutorily supplied factors, as well as other fac-
tors "normally" or "traditionally" considered by arbitrators. 50 The
conciliator's final report must be in writing and is appealable to
the court of common pleas. 5
1
The above is by no means an exhaustive detailing of the Act's
provisions.5 2 The rights, duties and procedures previously described,
however, will be the focus of the expected constitutional challenges
to the Act's validity.
45. Id. (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.14(C)(6)).
46. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(D)(2)). By granting to public
employees the right to strike, Ohio has joined the ranks of a distinct minority of states.
Other than Ohio, eight states (Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon,
Pennsylvania and Vermont) permit strikes by public employees. See I Pub. Bargaining
Cas. (CCH) 200.35 (1983); see also B. TAYLOR & F. WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW
648-49 (4th ed. 1983) ("there is no more explosive issue in the public sector than the
right of public employees to strike"). For a debate of the strike issue in the public employment
context, see Burton & Krider, The Role & Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE
L.J. 418 (1970) and Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
Ohio forbids public employee strikes during the life of any collective bargaining agree-
ment. Unlike federal law, moreover, an unfair labor practice is not a defense to a strike
when a collective bargaining agreement is in place. See 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-242,
5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE §§ 4117.11, 4117.18(C)).
47. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-242, 5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
4117.16(A)).
48. Id. (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE § 4117.16 (A)).
49. Using the alternate strike method, the conciliator is selected from a SERB-supplied
list of five conciliators. If the parties cannot agree, the SERB appoints the conciliator.
Id. at 5-243 (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE S 4117.14(D)(1)).
50. See id. at 5-244 (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(G)(7)).
51. Id. (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE § 4117.14(H)).
52. For example, the Act sets forth a list of unfair labor practices and the procedure
for resolving such charges. See id. at 5-242 to 5-243 (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE
§§ 4117.11-.13).
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IV. SENATE BILL 133: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY?
Ohio is one of a minority' of states providing for compulsory bind-
ing arbitration of certain bargaining disputes.53 Public health and
safety employees, as a quid pro quo for the prohibition against
strikes, have been extended the right to submit contract formation
disputes to a conciliator for resolution. 54 This provision for binding
interest arbitration is certain to spark a constitutional challenge to
the Act.
To understand this concern, it is necessary to distinguish interest
arbitration from the more traditional grievance arbitration frequently
engaged in by the private sector. Unlike grievance arbitration, which
involves the interpretation and application of the terms of an ex-
isting contract, interest arbitration asks the arbitrator to engage in
formation of the contract itself. Rather than merely interpreting con-
tract provisions, the arbitrator is responsible for actually creating
the contract.
This process raises questions of constitutional magnitude when
the employer is a governmental entity. The decisions made across
the bargaining table often can be deemed political,5 5 and for this
53. Those states providing for binding arbitration include Hawaii, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York. Oregon. Penn-
sylvania and Rhode Island. See 1 Pub. Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 200j.20 (1983) (summary
of impasse resolution provisions of the various states with public employee bargaining
legislation); see also 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 670, 672 (1976).
54. These workers are:
[M]embers of a police or fire department, members of the state highways patrol,
deputy sheriffs, dispatchers employed by a police, fire or sheriff's department
or the state highway patrol or civilian dispatchers, employed by a public employer
other than a police, fire, or sheriff's department to dispatch police, fire, sheriff's
department, or emergency medical or rescue personnel and units, an exclusive
nurse's unit, employees of the state school for the deaf or the state school for the
blind, employees of any public employee retirement system, corrections officers,
guards at penal or mental institutions, special policemen or policewomen appointed
in accordance with Sections 5119.14 and 5123.13 of the Revised Code, psychiatric
attendants employed at mental health forensic facilities, or youth leaders employed
at juvenile correctional . . . facilities.
1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-243 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
S4117.14(D)(1)).
All other public employees may submit voluntarily to binding arbitration, but they are
not required to do so. See id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE 5 4117.14(C)).
55. Professor Clyde Summers, in his discussion of the issue, went so far as to term
all major decisions in public employee bargaining "inescapably political" ones, involving
"critical policy choices." Summers, Public Sector Baraaining: Problems of Governmental Decision-
making, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 672 (1975); see also Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector
Interest Arbitration, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 678 (1976).
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reason, attempts to place such decisionmaking power in the hands
of an arbitrator almost uniformly raise cries that an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority has occurred.5 6
A. The Delegation Doctrine
It is the general rule, in Ohio as elsewhere, that delegation of
purely legislative power to another entity is prohibited. 57 But while
delegation of the authority to make laws is an unconstitutional ab-
dication of legislative power, administrative authority to execute laws
can be delegated validly. 58
The difficulty lies in distinguishing between "legislative" and "ad-
ministrative" authority. In an influential decision, the Supreme
Court of Ohio phrased the difference as follows:
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exer-
cised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made.5 9
56. In their oft-cited article, Professors Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter,
Jr. noted that the illegal delegation of authority concept had been "reduced to a whisper"
as a restraint against bargaining. See Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargain-
ing in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1108 (1969); see, e.g., Dayton Classroom
Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975).
The delegation doctrine, however, has become the primary vehicle for challenging the
validity of compulsory binding arbitration laws. In virtually every state with such a statute,
suits have been brought to void the law on the ground that an impermissible delegation
of legislative authority has occurred. See infra notes 66-100 and accompanying text.
57. See Peachtree Dev. Co. v. Paul, 67 Ohio St. 2d 345, 423 N.E.2d 1087 (1981);
see also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 149-223
(2d ed. 1978).
The delegation doctrine decidedly lacks vitality in the federal courts, with numerous
broad delegations being sustained in the years since Schechter and Panama Refining. See
1 K. DAvIs, supra, at 149-77. Federal courts nonetheless continue, at least on paper, to
recognize the doctrine, keeping in mind the so-called "Schechter spector."
State courts, however, remain much more vigorous in their policing of delegation.
See, e.g., Miller v. Covington Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d I (Ky. 1976); Blue Cross v. Ratch-
ford, 64 Ohio St. 2d 256, 260, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (1980). This difference probably
is based on the inescapable fact that state governments are smaller than the federal govern-
ment, making delegation less of a necessity in the context of state government.
58. See Green v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 90 Ohio St. 252, 107 N.E. 531 (1914);
State v. Messenger, 63 Ohio St. 398, 59 N.E. 105 (1900); Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.R.
v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
59. Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.R. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77,
88-89 (1852). For a recent discussion of the legislative versus administrative distinction,
see City of Covington v. Covington Lodge No. 1, Fraternal Order of Police, 622 S.W.2d
221 (Ky. 1981). In a unanimous opinion, the Kentucky court held unconstitutional a com-
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In other words, it is the legislature that must determine the policies
of the state, but the rules and regulations necessary to effect those
policies may be devised by other than elected officials.
Over the years, the concept of legislative "standards" has evolved
to refine this distinction. If the legislature has developed sufficient
standards to guide the recipient in the exercise of its delegated power,
then generally no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
is deemed to have occurred. 60 These "standards" need not be
precise, particularly when the legislation relates to the general public
welfare; rather, it is enough if "intelligible principles" are supplied
in the statute to guide the delegatee's discretion. 61
Some states have gone so far as to abandon the need for "stan-
dards," focusing instead on whether sufficient "safeguards" are pre-
sent to prevent capricious action by the administrative agency or
other delegatee. 62 Ohio, however, has rejected this modern trend,
insisting on the presence of standards before a delegation of authority
will pass constitutional muster. 63
pulsory binding arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the
city of Covington and its police department. It stated: "[I]f the power to be exercised
prescribes a new policy or plan, it is legislative, and may not be delegated. If it pursues
a plan already adopted by the legislative body, it is administrative and may be delegated."
Id. at 222.
60. Akron & B. Belt R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 148 Ohio St. 282, 287-89,
74 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1947) (no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power if ad-
ministrative agency must operate within fixed standards); State v. Abdulla, 37 Ohio App.
2d 82, 90, 307 N.E.2d 28, 33 (1973) ("Of course, standards for the guidance of the ex-
ecutive or administrative body must be given in the legislative enactment.").
61.
[A] statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes,
through legislative policy and such standards as are practical, an intelligible prin-
ciple to which the administrative officer or body must conform and further
establishes a procedure whereby exercise of the discretion can be reviewed effec-
tively. Ordinarily, the establishment of standards can be left to the administrative
body or officer if it is reasonable for the General Assembly to defer to the officer's
or body's expertise.
Blue Cross v. Ratchford, 64 Ohio St. 2d 256, 260, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (1980).
62. See, e.z., Medford Firefighters Ass'n Local 1431 v. City of Medford, 40 Or. App.
519, 595 P.2d 1268 (1979); see also I K. DAVIs, supra note 57, at 206-16.
63.
We are not prepared at this point to rely totally upon procedural safeguards.
Our past requirement of standards, although perhaps too rigidly stated, has pro-
tected private rights both in the clarity with which it defined the boundaries of
discretion and in the notice which it has given private parties of what is required
of them. As a consequence, standards, where practical, should be established by
the General Assembly.
Blue Cross v. Ratchford, 64 Ohio St. 2d 256, 260, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (1980); see
also Livingston v. Clawson, 2 Ohio App. 3d 173, 440 N.E.2d 1383 (1982). The presence
of adequate safeguards, however, is taken into account by almost all courts, including
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This standards and/or safeguards analysis has been invoked by
courts determining the constitutionality of compulsory binding ar-
bitration statutes. 64 An additional element, moreover, has been in-
jected in many of these cases: the "political accountability," or lack
thereof, of the arbitrator. 65 The varied results of these applications
of the delegation doctrine to binding arbitration laws, and their por-
tent for Ohio, are analyzed below.
B. Standards and Safeguards for Binding Arbitration
It has been said that "state courts generally uphold the constitu-
tionality of compulsory arbitration statutes. ',66 In the main, this is
true. A majority of states have upheld the constitutionality of bind-
ing interest arbitration for public employees. 67 But others have not,
and these differing results, in large measure, have been based on
the standards or safeguards supplied by the particular statute. 68
The existence of sufficient standards has been the initial inquiry
of most courts. Those legislatures more recently enacting bargain-
ing laws, perhaps profiting from the experience of other states, have
prescribed a list of factors to be considered by the arbitrator in
Ohio's, when deciding the validity of a challenged delegation. See, fbr example, Blue Cross,
64 Ohio St. 2d at 260, 416 N.E.2d at 618, in which the court noted the existence of a
procedure for review of agency discretion to be an important "safeguard."
64. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
65. See Greely Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976);
City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d 68 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); City of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire
Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's
Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of
Firefighters Locals 1645, 593, 1654 & 2064, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
66. B. TAYLOR & F. WITNEY, supra note 46, at 653; see also Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d
885 (1976).
67. See Superintending School Comm. v. Bangor Educ. Ass'n, 433 A.2d 383 (Me.
1981); Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352
N.E.2d 914 (1976); City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410, 294
N.W.2d 68 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); City of Richfield v. Local 1215,
Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979); Division 540, Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978);
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975);
Medford Firefighters Ass'n Local 1431 v. City of Medford, 40 Or. App. 519, 595 P.2d
1268 (1979); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v.
Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane
v. Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976).
68. See Greely Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976);
City of Sioux Falls v. Firefighters, 85 L.R.R.M. 2066 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 1973); Salt Lake
City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters Locals 1645, 593, 1654 & 2064, 563 P.2d 786
(Utah 1977); see also Town of Berlin v. Santaguida, 98 L.R.R.M. 3259 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1978), unenforced on other grounds, 181 Conn. 421, 435 A.2d 980 (1980).
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reaching his decision. 69 The listing of such criteria usually is deemed,
without much discussion, to satisfy the standards requirement, par-
ticularly when the statute recites a purpose, such as promoting in-
dustrial peace.70 Some courts even have found that a policy state-
ment alone can provide guidance sufficient to validate the
delegation.71
Even when the statute does set forth specific criteria to guide the
arbitrator, to be of use the criteria must be reasonably specific. For
example, an arbitrator directed to consider "prevailing wages" is left
to speculate as to whose wages he should be contemplating.72 To
69. See, for example, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO
REV. CODE S 4117.14(G)(7)), which supplies the following factors to be considered by
the arbitrator:
(a) Past collectively bargained agreements, if any, between the parties;
(b) Comparison of the issues submitted to final offer settlement relative to the
employees in the bargaining unit involved with those issues related to other public
and private employees doing comparable work, giving consideration to factors
peculiar to the area and dassification involved;
(c) The interests and welfare of the public, the ability of the public employer
to finance and administer the issues proposed, and the effect of the adjustments
on the normal standard of public service;
(d) The lawful authority of the public employer;
(e) The stipulations of the parties;
(f) Such other factors, not confined to those listed in this section, which are
normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of the issues
submitted to final offer settlement through voluntary collective bargaining, media-
tion, fact-finding, or other impasse resolution procedures in the public service or
in private employment.
70. See, e.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass.
769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976); City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich.
410, 294 N.W.2d 68 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); Medford Firefighters
Ass'n Local 1431 v. City of Medford, 40 Or. App. 519, 595 P.2d 1268 (1979).
71. See, e.g., Superintending School Comm. v. Bangor Educ. Ass'n, 433 A.2d 383
(Me. 1981); City of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d
42 (Minn. 1979).
Such a broad "standard," of course, is, in reality, no standard at all. In practical terms,
a direction to "promote industrial peace" gives no guidance to an arbitrator. For instance,
does promoting industrial peace envision peace at any price? As the arbitrator has not
been directed to consider the government employer's ability to pay, it could be so assumed.
Such an open-ended directive provides no protection against arbitrary and capricious acts.
Additionally, standards "inherent" in the arbitration process have been cited. It has
been said that acting within the scope of authority, considering the public interest and
welfare, and acting to stabilize and promote industrial peace are part and parcel of the
arbitral process and can thus be read into an arbitration provision, thereby serving as
standards. See Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improve-
ment Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978). Under New Jersey's statute, however,
some explicit standards existed, and thus the court was not forced to rely on merely "in-
herent" standards in upholding the law. But see Superintending School Comm. v. Bangor
Educ. Ass'n, 433 A.2d 383 (Me. 1981).
72. See Town of Berlin v. Santaguida, 98 L.R.R.M. 3259 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978),
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be meaningful, more concrete guidance should be, and under re-
cent statutes usually is, supplied.
Admittedly, precise directives cannot be given when delegating
contract formation authority. In fashioning a contract, the arbitrator
needs some flexibility, which rigid guidelines would inhibit.
Ohio's "standards" attempt to achieve this balance. The conciliator
is given five identified factors to weigh. 73 He is instructed, for in-
stance, to consider the employer's ability to pay and is directed to
contrast the unit's wages and working conditions with those of com-
parable workers in the public and private sectors, taking into ac-
count any "peculiarities" of the area. While hardly black and white
directives, such factors do attempt to counsel the arbitrator's deci-
sionmaking process. Furthermore, the arbitrator may not propose
his own solutions; rather, he is bound to select, on an issue-by-issue
basis, the last best offer submitted by the parties. 74
But such guidelines, standing alone, cannot sustain the
delegation. 75 Because the subject matter of binding arbitration
unenforced on other grounds, 181 Conn. 421, 435 A.2d 980 (1980); Firefighters Local 2390
v. City of Kingsville, 98 L.R.R.M. 2512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
In City of Kingsville, the arbitrator, considered to be the judiciary under Texas law,
was directed to institute wages and conditions of employment "substantially the same"
as those prevailing in the private section "labor market area." The court found such "stan-
dards" insufficient guards against arbitrary and unequal application, noting that deciding
what conditions were "substantially the same" and what constitutes the "labor market
area" were policy decisions. Taking a rather strict approach to the delegation doctrine,
the court stated: "A delegation of a legislative power is valid if it is so complete in all
its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch that nothing is left to the
judgment of the recipient of a delegated power." 98 L.R.R.M. at 2515. The court found
the delegation at issue, with is imprecise guidelines, fell short of this mark.
73. The sixth factor, defined as those factors "normally" and "traditionally" considered
in interest arbitration, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO
REV. CODE 5 4117.14(G)(1)(7)(0), cannot be termed "reasonably specific." This factor
appears to be an attempt to place the "inherent standards" recognized by the courts in
Bangor Educ. Ass'n and Amalgamated Transit explicitly into the statute. See supra note 71.
74. See 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
4117.14(G)(7)). But see City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410,
514-15, 294 N.W.2d 68, 111 (1980) (Levin, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S.
903 (1981). In his dis.sent, Justice Levin found such "last best offer" arbitration of little
help, stating this approach would simply exacerbate problems because the arbitrator would
be prohibited from fashioning the best over-all award. He also deemed the eight specific
factors, similar to Ohio's, as "sufficiently amorphous" to allow any result. For example,
while the arbitrator is directed to consider the "public welfare," he must decide what con-
stitutes the public welfare before he can determine how best it can be served. 408 Mich.
at 515, 294 N.W.2d at 111.
75. Whether these traditional standards are even useful in the compulsory arbitration
context has been questioned. The usual delegation of authority cases involve delegations
to a public officer or to an administrative agency that will have continuing responsibility
for administering the particular law. In such a context, a consistent response to and inter-
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statutes permits only reasonably, as opposed to explicitly, specific
directives, other safeguards are needed. 7 6 Timetables for rendering
decisions, requirements for written opinions and, perhaps most im-
portant, judicial review, have been deemed essential protections
against arbitrary acts.77
These safeguards are but imperfectly included in Ohio's act.
Under the statute, the conciliator must hold a hearing within thirty
days of the SERB's arbitration order only when "practicable" to do
so. 78 Even though the conciliator must make written findings of fact
and must issue a written opinion, no timetable for rendering the
decision is supplied.7 9 And the judicial review specified is of the most
limited sort. A party can seek to modify or to vacate the award,
yet there exist serious statutory strictures on a court's power to
disturb an arbitration award. 80 Such limited review is tantamount
to virtually no review, as the case law teaches that courts have taken
a "hands off" approach to arbitration awards. 81 While such deference
pretation of the standards can be expected. But when authority has been delegated to
numerous private arbitrators, even specific and precise "standards" may provide little pro-
tection against unbridled discretion. See City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n,
408 Mich. 410, 514, 294 N.W.2d 68, 111 (1980) (Levin, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed,
450 U.S. 903 (1981).
76. See Superintending School Comm. v. Bangor Educ. Ass'n, 433 A.2d 383 (Me.
1981), in which the court noted the necessity of procedural safeguards when precise stan-
dards feasibly cannot be supplied. See also Caso v. Coffey, 41 N.Y.2d 153, 359 N.E.2d
683, 391 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1976).
77. In Town of Berlin v. Santaguida, 98 L.R.R.M. 3259 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978),
unenforced on other grounds, 181 Conn. 421, 435 A.2d 980 (1980), that it contained no pro-
cedure for judicial review and did not require written opinions were cited as reasons for
invalidating the statute. The court in Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer
County Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978) took a different approach,
reading judicial review into the law in order to sustain the statute. In doing so, the court
adopted a "substantial evidence" standard, observing the need for broader judicial review
than that accorded voluntary arbitration. See supra note 71.
Whether judicial review actually constitutes a safeguard has been questioned, however,
on the basis that whether the award is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable cannot be
determined from the written award. A study of police and firefighters interest arbitration
in New York purports to show that rationales for awards "bear little relationship to the
actual factors shaping the awards." Wollet, Revenue Sharing, Whipsawing and the Domino Ef-
fect of Arbitration, PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS 88 (1977).
78. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
4117.14(G)(2)).
79. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(G)(10)).
80. An award may be vacated only upon a showing of fraud, partiality, corruption,
prejudicial misconduct or a showing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority or imperfectly
executed his powers. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Page 1981).
81. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local 200, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
& Plastic Workers, 42 Ohio St. 2d 516, 330 N.E.2d 703 (1975); Pfleger v. Renner, 13
Ohio App. 96 (1920).
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perhaps is warranted in the context of voluntary arbitration, it has
no place in the compulsory arbitration area. 82 Indeed, this limited
review, of itself, places the Act's constitutionality in question.
83
C. Political Accountability
An additional issue focused on by courts deciding challenges to
compulsory binding arbitration laws has been the political account-
ability, or lack thereof, of the arbitrator. This issue is somewhat
unusual, in that the vast majority of legislative delegations are to
public officials or administrative agencies. In contrast, delegations
arising from compulsory arbitration laws generally are to indepen-
dent, ad hoc arbitrators. Many courts thus have considered whether
a delegation of authority to an individual not directly answerable
to the electorate-a "hit-and-run" arbitrator-can be constitutionally
sustained. By and large, the courts have found it can be.
Instructive is the Supreme Court of Michigan's comprehensive
opinion in City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Association, in which
the court, in a three-one-three decision, upheld the challenged
delegation. 84 In sustaining the law, the plurality opinion found the
arbitrators to be sufficiently accountable. Under Michigan's law,
the impartial arbitrator must be a member of a permanent arbitra-
tion panel, whose members are selected by the Michigan Employ-
ment Relations Commission (MERC).8 5 The plurality opinion found
82. See Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improvement
Auth., 76 NJ. 245, 386 A.2d 1290 (1978); see also Grodin, supra note 55, at 698. In
Amalgamated Transit, no method of judicial review was specified, and the court read into
the law the mode of review necessary to sustain the statute, the "substantial evidence"
standard of review. Under Ohio's law, however, the judicial review deemed inadequate
by the New Jersey court (a motion to vacate) is specified statutorily and denies an Ohio
court the power to fashion a stronger form of review.
83. See Town of Berlin v. Santaguida, 98 L.R.R.M. 3259 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978),
unenforced on other grounds, 181 Conn. 421, 435 A.2d 980 (1980) (motion to vacate or to
modify arbitration award was no "meaningful substitute for judicial reivew"; binding ar-
bitration law deemed unconstitutional).
84. 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d 68 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981). In
City of Detroit, three justices upheld the statute by finding the arbitrators politically ac-
countable, while the three dissenters found such accountability lacking and the statute
accordingly constitutionally deficient. In his concurrence, Justice Fitzgerald rejected the
majority opinion's finding of accountability but determined such accountability was un-
necessary to uphold the statute.
85. Id. at 434-35, 294 N.W.2d at 71-72. Additionally, an arbitrator must be a citizen
of Michigan, must take an oath of office, and enjoys an indeterminate term of office on
the arbitration panel. Id., 294 N.W.2d at 72. These requirements were amended into
Michigan law after an earlier court decision had questioned, on accountability grounds,
the constitutionality of the statute. See Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local 412 v. City
of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.E.2d 226 (1975).
[Vol. 53
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING
this procedure ensured continuity in decisionmaking and noted the
arbitrators are chosen by the MERC, whose members in turn are
selected by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. These
factors, said the plurality justices, made the arbitrators politically
accountable. 8 6
Four justices disagreed. In his concurrence, Justice Fitzgerald
observed that it "stretches credulity" to find the arbitrators politically
accountable to the electorate. But Fitzgerald deemed accountabili-
ty of delegatees not constitutionally required. 87 The three other
justices likewise found accountability lacking but judged this omis-
sion a fatal flaw. Because the statute "insulate[d] the decision-making
process from accountability within the political process" and because
a structure for development of principles and policies was missing,
they considered the delegation to be invalid. 88
The three opinions in City of Detroit are prototypes for the three
86. 408 Mich. at 433, 294 N.W.2d at 71. "Considered collectively, the aforementioned
factors tend to eradicate the image of 'hit-and-run arbitrators' and act as a catalyst to
the establishment of a class of arbitrators possessing both the aspects of tenure and respon-
sibility which are certainly compatible with the notion of political or public accountability."
Id. at 470, 294 N.W.2d at 90.
The plurality rejected the argument that political accountability requires accountabil-
ity to the specific community or other governmental entity involved. The city had argued
that because the arbitrators, and the MERC members, were not directly accountable to
the people of Detroit, political accountability was lacking and the statute was thus un-
constitutional. The plurality found this argument went to.the wisdom, but not to the con-
stitutionality, of enacting a statewide policy for resolving "inherently local public-sector
labor disputes." Id. at 475-77, 294 N.W.2d at 93-94. The court stated:
This argument blinks the reality that the role of both the Act 312 arbitrators
and the MERC appointing authority is to effectuate a state labor policy as for-
mulated by the state Legislature serving the state electorate. Work stoppages by
municipal police and fire departments, although primarily local in situs, were
legislatively deemed to pose a threat to the state's public health, safety and welfare.
Should the people be dissatisfied with the accountability aspect of the engineered
scheme which must necessarily transcend local boundaries, the onus is upon the
state's electorate, including the locally affected voting poRulation, to exercise its
political will.
Id. at 477, 294 N.W.2d at 94.
87. Id. at 505-07, 294 N.W.2d at 107.
88. The lack of a controlling body to administer the law, reasoned the dissent, in-
evitably would lead to differing results in like situations, violating the premise that a law
constitutionally cannot treat similar situations differently. The dissent would have approved
the delegation to an administrative agency, reasoning that were a controlling body respon-
sible for developing arbitration principles, accountability would exist. Id. at 522, 294
N.W.2d at 114.
Permanent arbitration tribunals have been advocated by others. "Equity of results and
the public interest require a high level of consistency in decisions that statutory criteria
alone may not provide." Staudohar, Constitutionality of Compulsory Arbitration Statutes in Public
Employment, 27 LABOR L.J. 670, 676 (1976). Nebraska has adopted such a system. See
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-801 to -838 (1978).
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approaches courts considering the question have taken to the ac-
countability issue. Courts either have "stretched credulity" by sug-
gesting that accountability exists,89 have deemed the law unconstitu-
tional for lack of accountability9" or have found accountability not
constitutionally required.91
Plainly, one of the latter two positions is correct. To hold, as does
the first approach, that a private arbitrator is accountable to the
electorate because he is appointed by a state board, itself appointed
by the governor, who is elected by the people, or that he is publicly
answerable because he exercises public power is to indulge in judicial
fantasy. Appointment of private individuals on an ad hoc basis clearly
supplies no degree of responsibility to the electorate. Neither con-
sistency of decisions, nor rules for decisionmaking, is guaranteed.
Quite simply, if public accountability is constitutionally necessary,
then binding arbitration laws generally, including Ohio's, are
suspect. 92
89. In City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d
206 (1969), for example, the court held that by arbitrating a public employer-public
employee bargaining dispute, the arbitrator becomes a public officer and that these "public
officers" together comprise an "administrative agency." In effect, the uncontrolled exer-
cise of sovereign power transforms the private individual into a public officer, the Rhode
Island court reasoned. See also Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration,
370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976).
Such reasoning rightly has been criticized as "tautological." See Town of Berlin v. San-
taguida, 98 L.R.R.M. 3259 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978), unenforced on other grounds, 181 Conn.
421, 435 A.2d 980 (1980). To hold that by exercising public power one automatically
becomes a public official accountable to the el&torate is simply to restate the issue the
court is purporting to resolve. For other decisions finding arbitrators politically account-
able, see City of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42
(Minn. 1979) (statutory requirements of training and experience along with statutorily
required consideration of financial impact and promotion of "harmonious relationships"
ensure accountability); Medford Firefighters Ass'n Local 1431 v. City of Medford, 40
Or. App. 519, 595 P.2d 1268 (1979) (arbitrators appointed by state employment relations
board act in a public capacity).
90. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 422, 553 P.2d 790,
792 (1976) ("officials engaged in governmental decision-making ... must be accountable
to the citizens they represent"); Town of Berlin v. Santaguida, 98 L.R.R.M. 3259 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1978), unenforced on other grounds, 181 Conn. 421, 435 A.2d 980 (1980) (ap-
pointment on hit-and-run basis makes connection between arbitrator and board too at-
tenuated to guarantee arbitrator's political accountability); Salt Lake City v. International
Ass'n of Firefighters Locals 1645, 593, 1654 & 2064, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977) (private
ad hoc panel of arbitrators not politically accountable).
91. See Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769,
352 N.E.2d 914 (1976) (political accountability not a constitutional argument); Milwaukee
County v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1982)
(political accountability argument relates to wisdom of legislation, not to its constitutional-
ity). See also Grodin, supra note 55.
92. Under the Ohio Act, the arbitrator is chosen by the parties from a SERB-supplied
list of five persons. If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator, the SERB will appoint
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The question thus becomes whether political accountability is re-
quired to sustain a delegation of arbitral authority. It is submitted
that the answer to this question depends upon the scope of the ar-
bitrator's power.
The basis of the political accountability requirement is that policy-
making powers must be placed in the hands of a politically respon-
sive person or group. 93 Thus, to the extent the arbitrator is not
deciding ultimate governmental policy, the need for accountability
diminishes. Examination of the scope of the arbitrator's authority
in those states finding accountability either present or unnecessary
supports this theory to a degree, as some of those states decree that
certain critical policy decisions are outside the arbitrator's power
to decide. 94
The decisions cannot all be so reconciled, however. In some states
in which accountability was not deemed a constitutional require-
ment, the independent arbitrator was delegated authority to decide
questions that may fairly be labeled governmental policy decisions. 95
Setting wage levels, for example, must be considered an ultimate
governmental policy-making power. 96 When such authority is
an arbitrator from its own list or from a list prepared by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, an arbitral service frequently used by private sector parties in grievance arbitra-
tions. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-243 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CoDE
§ 4117.14(D)(1)). The only statutory requirement for selection is that the arbitrator be an
Ohio resident. Id. at 5-244 (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.14(G)(13)). No
permanent panel of arbitrators is established, nor is there any oath-taking requirement.
Thus, the Ohio Act's "accountability" provisions are even less extensive than are
Michigan's. Indeed, it is unlikely the Michigan court would have upheld the Ohio law.
See Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231
N.W.2d 226 (1975).
93. See City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d
68 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n
of Firefighters Locals 1645, 593, 1654 & 2064, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
94. See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973) (ar-
bitrator may not make binding decisions on economic proposals); City of Detroit v. Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d 68 (1980) (arbitrator may decide only
disputes involving wage rates or other conditions of employment, inherent managerial
matter presumably not subject to arbitration), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); City
of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979)
(inherently managerial matters not subject to negotiation or arbitration).
95. See, e.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass.
769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976); Milwaukee County v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 109
Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.3d 350 (Ct. App. 1982). Massachusetts, however, explicitly ex-
cluded "inherent managerial matters," such as promotions and transfers, from binding
arbitration. &e 2 PuB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 19,705 (1977). And in 1980,
binding arbitration for firefighters and police officers was repealed by voter passage of
Proposition 2 1/2. 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) SLL 31:263 (1981).
96.
The size of the budget, the taxes to be levied, the purposes for which tax money
is to be used, the kinds and levels of governmental services to be enjoyed, and
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reposed outside the legislature, only political accountability of the
delegatee can ensure protection against capricious exercise of discre-
tionary power.
Under the theory that they are purely legislative in nature, such
powers arguably are not subject to delegation. 97 Yet the better view
suggests that when the delegatee determines only wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment98 and when the exercise
of his power is confined narrowly by consideration of reasonably
the level of indebtedness are issues that should be decided by officials who are
politically responsible to those who pay the taxes and seek the services.
Summers, supra note 55, at 672. Justice Levin, writing in dissent in City of Detroit v. Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n, agreed. "[Whether other budgeted items are of a higher or lower priority
than police and fire salaries is] the prototype of a decision which should be entrusted only
to a politically accountable official or body." 408 Mich. 410, 437, 294 N.W.2d 68, 121
(1980) (Levin, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981). In a pre-Act case,
an Ohio court concurred. In City of Tiffin v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 1 Pub.
Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 37,470 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pls. 1981), the court found binding
arbitration of wages illegal. "To allow an arbitrator to have binding authority to set salary
levels would be tantamount to the council surrendering its nondelegable power in this area."
Other courts and commentators think differently. Because it is the legislative body that
must supply the monies to fund the award, these authorities find that the arbitrators are
not exercising governmental power. See Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation &
Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976). See also York, Anderson, MacDonald
& O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining-An Examination of Com-
pulsory Interest Arbitration in New York, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 453 (1977), in which the
authors stated:
[N]either arbitration awards nor collective bargaining agreements in the public
sector are self-implementing. If legislative authorization to finance a contract or
an arbitration award does not already exist, the executive must secure such fund-
ing from the legislature, reduce services, decline to fill vacancies, or take other
management action to implement the agreement. The important point is that either
before or after contract negotiations, the legislature must decide the appropriate
level for government operations and provide the required funding.
Id. at 468. This argument, however, overlooks the fundamental point that it is an ar-
bitrator who has determined that wages and/or fringe benefits for a particular group are
of a higher priority than other services, leaving the "politically accountable" body to scram-
ble to find the funds, from whatever source, to implement the award. While the governmen-
tal body indeed does decide where to cut back, it has not made the crucial decision that
a cut back should be made.
97. See City of Covington v. Covington Lodge No. 1, Fraternal Order of Police, 622
S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1981); City of Tiffin v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 1 Pub. Bargain-
ing Cas. (CCH) 37,470 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pls. 1981). Pennsylvania, for example, amended
its constitution specifically to permit binding arbitration. See Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa.
183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
98. "Terms and conditions of employment" must be narrowly construed because vir-
tually any management decision may have an impact on these. But when a government
employer is involved, the scope of mandatory bargaining, and of the concomitant duty
to submit to binding arbitration, must be construed in a manner that will preserve to the
employer its discretionary power over fundamental policy decisions. Otherwise, an im-
permissible delegation will have occurred. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
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specific factors and by meaningful judicial review, political account-
ability can save the delegation. Thus, if the delegation were to a
politically responsive official or agency, assuming sufficient stan-
dards and safeguards exist, the delegation should be sustained.
Should the delegation go further, however, and distribute authority
to determine issues involving inherent managerial rights, then a
delegation of purely legislative power would result. 99 Government
must retain the right to make its fundamental policy determinations. 100
Delegation of such powers, regardless of standards, safeguards or
accountability, unquestionably is constitutionally prohibited.
D. Senate Bill 133: An Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative
Authority
The above analysis directs a finding that the Ohio Act contains
an unconstitutional delegation of authority. Of course, the lack of
meaningful judicial review and the absence of specific guidelines
for exercise of the delegated power pose considerable hurdles for
sustaining the delegation. 10' More dispositive, however, the breadth
of authority delegated requires not only political accountability,
notably missing, but also a finding that an impermissible delega-
tion of purely legislative power has occurred.
The Act provides a hit-and-run arbitrator with perhaps the
broadest scope of authority of any public employee bargaining bill
in the nation. First, the arbitrator, on impasse, undeniably has power
to resolve disputes concerning wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. 102 Even assuming a narrow construction
is given to "terms and conditions of employment," as it must be to
sustain even the bargaining delegation, 03 political accountability
99. See City of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42
(Minn. 1979) (upholds statute, noting that city need not, by statute, negotiate inherently
managerial matters); Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer County Im-
provement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 251, 386 A.2d 1290, 1293 (1978) (arbitration process may
not encompass governmental policy determinations involving exercise of delegated police
power); see also Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 624 P.2d 1215, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (1981) (en banc).
100. See Peachtree Dev. Co. v. Paul, 67 Ohio St. 2d 345, 423 N.E.2d 1087 (1981);
Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.R. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852).
101. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
102. These are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Act. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv.
5-241 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.08).
103. See Paterson Police PBA Local 1 v. City of Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 432 A.2d 847
(1981); State v. Local 195, IFPTE, 179 N.J. Super. 146, 430 A.2d 966 (1981). Professor
Grodin states that the scope of interest arbitration arguably should be narrower than the
scope of bargaining when public sector arbitration is involved. He posits, however, that
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of the arbitrator is still necessary. Ohio's Act fails to supply this
answerability, as the arbitrators are private individuals, selected on
an ad hoc basis, who are not members of any politically responsive,
permanent tribunal, panel or board.' 0 4 The only "accountability"
provided by the statute is a requirement that the arbitrators be Ohio
residents.' 05 Thus, even if the arbitrator could determine only
disputes involving wages, hours, and narrowly defined terms and
conditions of employment, the necessary degree of political account-
ability would be lacking.
But the scope of the arbitrator's authority under the Act arguably
is even broader. Not only does the arbitrator have full author-
ity to resolve disputes concerning wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, he may also, if the Act is so con-
strued, override statutes and decide questions of inherent managerial
policy. It is this aspect of arbitral authority in which the Ohio Act
differs from other states' bargaining laws. And it is this aspect that
must be viewed as an impermissible delegation of purely legislative
power.
The Act specifies that an employer "is not required to bargain
on subjects reserved to the management and direction of the govern-
mental unit except as affect wages, hours, terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and the continuation, modification, or deletion of an existing provision
of a collective bargaining agreement. ''106 This italicized phrase grants the
arbitrator open-ended authority.
The exercise of a purely managerial right that merely would
affect the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of
public employees theoretically becomes a mandatory subject of
bargaining and, correspondingly, in the context of public health and
safety agreements, an issue for interest arbitration as well. Because
virtually every exercise of a managerial right necessarily will affect,
to a degree, "terms and conditions of employment," this provision
the arbitrator should have power to resolve all disputes involving mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Grodin, supra note 55, at 695. Professor Grodin limited his remarks to the
'policies" rather than the "constitutionality" of binding interest arbitration.
104. See 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE
4117.14(D)(1)); see also supra note 90.
105. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-244 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE
4117.14(G)(13)).
106. Id. at 5-241 (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.08) (emphasis added).
Otherwise, managerial rights are permissive subjects for bargaining under the Act. At least
one court has held, however, that management rights never can be bargained away, even
voluntarily, because to do so is an unconstitutional delegation of authority. Paterson Police
PBA Local I v. City of Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 432 A.2d 847 (1981).
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in essence entrusts inherently managerial decisions to a politically
unaccountable arbitrator.
If the parties, moreover, have included a clause or provision in
their contract, then that topic becomes an issue for mandatory
bargaining. Inherent managerial rights may, if the Act is so con-
strued, fall within this provision.. Most, if not all, collective bargain-
ing agreements in the private sector, and undoubtedly those in ex-
istence in the public sector as well, contain a management rights
provision. Such a provision simply may recite the employer's re-
tained and inherent managerial rights. 107 Once included in the con-
tract, however, these rights arguably have become mandatory sub-
jects for bargaining, and, as such, are questions the arbitrator has
full authority to determine upon impasse. 10 8
It is this delegation that makes the Act more constitutionally
suspect than the laws of Ohio's sister states. In no other state, to
the authors' knowledge, are inherent managerial rights even arguably
within the province of an arbitrator. While courts in some states
have upheld the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration statutes
challenged as illegal delegations, they often have done so by
acknowledging that inherent governmental authority has not been
surrendered. 109 Plainly Ohio has delegated purely legislative power;
in so doing, it has crossed the outermost limits of permissible delega-
tion established by the Ohio courts. 110
Should the Ohio courts determine that an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative authority has occurred, they will need to decide
whether the binding arbitration provisions of the Act are severable.' 1 '
The Act contains no severability clause, but, in Ohio,
[i]t is a general rule that if an unconstitutional part of an Act is
107. See Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-241 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
S 4117.08(C)) for a partial list of such rights.
108. Another example of the expansive delegation of legislative authority under the
Act exists. See id. (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE § 4117.10). Under this provision,
a collective bargaining agreement prevails over all statutes, except certain enumerated
ones, such as civil rights provisions.
109. See, e.g., City of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d
42 (Minn. 1979); Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improve-
ment Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 251, 386 A.2d 1290, 1293 (1978).
110. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the delegation
doctrine in Ohio.
111. Compare Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters Locals 1654, 593,
1654 & 2064, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977) (holding entire state law unconstitutional because
arbitration provisions were an "integral part" of act) with Greeley Police Union v.
City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976) (severed arbitration provision from
statute using act's severability clause).
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stricken, and if that which remains is complete in and of itself, and
capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative
intent, wholly independent of that which is rejected, the remaining
part must be sustained." 2
A three-part test has been developed to aid a court in making
this determination. First, it must be decided whether the constitu-
tional and the unconstitutional portions of the Act can stand alone.
Second, whether the legislative intent can be effected without the
stricken part or whether the Act is instead inextricably intertwined
must be resolved. Finally, the court must consider if language would
need to be added to the remaining provision(s) if the unconstitu-
tional section(s) were deleted." 3
Under this test, the entire Act must fail. Focusing on the second
prong, it is clear the binding arbitration provisions are so intercon-
nected with the remainder of the statute as to prevent a severance.
The Act's intent is to "promote orderly and constructive relation-
ships" in public employment. 1 14 To this end, public health and safety
employees have been refused the right to strike while being granted
the right to submit bargaining disputes to binding arbitration.
Removing the arbitration provisions would leave this group of
employees without any method for resolving their bargaining con-
flicts. Such a result would not effect the purpose of promoting orderly
relationships with this crucial segment of employees. Thus, the en-
tire Act, if successfully challenged under the impermissible delega-
tion theory, cannot stand.
V. UNIT DETERMINATIONS
Another challenge undoubtedly forthcoming to the constitutional-
ity of the Act arises from the SERB's authority to make final bargain-
ing unit determinations. But unlike a delegation-of-authority
challenge, this assault should fail.
The group of job classifications that will participate in a union
representation election is known, in labor parlance, as the bargain-
ing unit. Just as the NLRB is given power under the NLRA to
make this critical determination,"15 the SERB is to determine an
appropriate unit for bargaining under the Ohio Act." 16
112. Livingston v. Clawson, 2 Ohio App. 3d 173, 177, 440 N.E.2d 1383, 1388 (1982).
113. Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 160 N.E. 28 (1927).
114. See 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-245 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE
4117.22).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
116. See Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-240 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE
4117.06(A)).
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In making this determination, the SERB is directed to consider
a variety of factors, some of which traditionally have been assessed
by the NLRB in making unit determinations.'i7 The Act, moreover,
contains certain specific prohibitions against including particular
employees within certain units, thus limiting, to a degree, the
SERB's unit determination authority." 18
Under Ohio law, however, the SERB's unit determinations are
"final and conclusive and not appealable to the Court." 119 This
unusual provision appeared in the public employee bargaining law
of one other state, and its presence led that state's supreme court
to invalidate the entire bargaining bill. 120 Thus, a similar challenge
to Ohio's Act is all but certain.
In Indiana Education Employment Relations Board v. Benton Commu-
nity School Corp., the Supreme Court of Indiana found Indiana's
bargaining law unconstitutional because the law prohibited judicial
review of an administrative agency decision. 12 ' Like the Ohio Act,
Indiana's law expressly excluded from court review the board's unit
determination decisions. 22 The Indiana high court held judicial
review of administrative decisions required by the due process pro-
117. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(B)). The SERB is directed to
consider, "among other relevant factors," any bargaining history and the employees' com-
munity of interest as reflected by their wages, hours and working conditions, factors
historically considered by the NLRB. The SERB additionally is to take into account the
effect of over-fragmentation, the employer's efficiency of operations and adminstrative
structure, and the desires of the employees.
118. For example, professional and nonprofessional employees cannot be included in
the same unit unless a majority of each group votes for inclusion in the unit. Id. (to be
codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)(1)). Under federal law, only the professional
employees must approve inclusion. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
Under the Ohio Act, guards, correction officers, specially appointed police officers and
certain employees of mental health and juvenile correction facilities cannot be included
in a unit with other employees. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-240 (Baldwin) (to be codified
at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)(2)). Police and fire department members, as well as
members of the state highway patrol, cannot be included in units with other classifica-
tions of employees in their departments. Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
§ 4117.06(D)(3)). Police department units are subject to a further limitation: rank and file
officers must be in a unit separate from members who are at the rank of sergeant or above.
Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)(6)). Units are limited to one institu-
tion of higher education and are subject to accreditation standards of such institutions.
Id. (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.06(D)(4)). Last, restrictions have been placed
on units composed of employees of elected county officials. Id. (to be codified at OHIO
REV. CODE S 4117.06(D)(5)).
119. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-240 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE
4117.06(A)).
120. See Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community School Corp.,
266 Ind. 491, 507-10, 365 N.E.2d 752, 760-61 (1977).
121. Id. at 510, 365 N.E.2d at 761.
122. With the exception of its prohibition against judicial review, the Indiana act, in
large part, mimicked the NLRA. Id. at 500-04, 365 N.E.2d at 756-58.
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visions of the state constitution."' Because the Indiana law un-
equivocally denied judicial review, it was unconstitutional. And
because the unconstitutional provisions were "so unique and shape[d]
the fundamental character of Indiana's public employee bargain-
ing statute," they were not severable. 12 4 Thus, the entire act was
voided.
Despite the similarity of provisions, a like result is not mandated
by the Ohio law. While Ohio, too, declares unit determinations not
appealable, crucial distinctions can be made between the Ohio and
Indiana laws, and these distinctions should serve to save the Ohio
Act.
In voiding the statute, the Indiana court recognized that under
Indiana law collateral, as well as direct, judicial review was foreclosed.
In contrast, the Ohio law can and should be construed to preclude
only direct review of unit determinations. A public employer in Ohio
should be able to obtain review of the SERB's unit determination
by refusing to bargain and thereafter raising the issue in its challenge
to the resulting bargaining order.
It is this procedure that is followed under the NLRA, a law strik-
ingly similar to Ohio's. 125 Under both federal and Ohio law, once
a proper unit has been determined, an election is ordered. If the
union wins, the union is certified as the exclusive representative of
the employees. At this time, the employer's duty to bargain arises. 126
Under the NLRA and the Ohio Act, it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer to refuse to bargain with the certified union, and
the Ohio Act sets forth a procedure for resolution of unfair labor
practices.127 Once a complaint is filed, the SERB will hold a hear-
123. Id. at 506, 365 N.E.2d at 760.
"Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an appeal from an administrative
agency. It is correct to say that the orders of an administrative body are subject
to judicial review; and that they must be so to meet the requirements of due pro-
cess. Such review is necessary to the end that there may be an adjudication by
a court of competent jurisdiction that the agency has acted within the scope of
its powers; that substantial evidence supports the factual conclusions; and that
its determination comports with the law applicable to the facts found."
Id. at 507, 365 N.E.2d at 760 (quoting Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co., 217 Ind. 93, 104-05,
26 N.E.2d 399, 404 (1940)).
124. Id. at 510; 365 N.E.2d at 761.
125. Compare 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-238 to 5-246 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 4117.01-.23) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976).
126. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), 158(d) (1976); 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-240 (Baldwin)
(to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4117.05, 4117.04(B)).
127. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-242 (Baldwin) (to be
codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.11(A)(5)).
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ing and can issue a cease and desist order, requiring the employer
to bargain. The employer may then appeal the SERB's order to
the court of common pleas.' 2 8
Thus, under this scheme, an employer ultimately may obtain
review of the unit determination, notwithstanding the "final and
conclusive and not appealable" language of the Act. 2 9 Once an elec-
tion has been ordered, an employer need only refuse to bargain with
the union. On court appeal of a subsequent bargaining order, the
unit determination may be raised as a defense to the SERB's unfair
labor practice decision.1 30
The Indiana statute, unlike Ohio law, could not have been so
interpreted. Its prohibitions against judicial review were found in
its unfair labor practice provision. ' 3' That law, moreover, specifically
excluded from the record to be filed in court, on review of unfair
128. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-242 to 5-243 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHio REV.
CODE §5 4117.12, 4117.13. These procedures are similar to those in the NLRA. See 29
U.S.C. § 159, 160 (1976).
129. See 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-240 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIo REV. CODE
4117.06(A)).
130. Such was the construction given to the NLRA. In American Fed. of Labor v. NLRB,
the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
"[1]f subsequently the Board makes an order predicated upon the election, such
as an order to bargain collectively with elected representatives, then the entire
election procedure becomes part of the record upon which the order of the Board
is based, and is fully reviewable by an aggrieved party in the Federal courts in
the manner provided in section 10. And this review would include within its scope
the action of the Board in determining the appropriate unit for purposes of the
election. This provides a complete guarantee against arbitrary action by the Board."
308 U.S. 401, 410 n.3 (1940) (quoting S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14). See
also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 154 (1941) (no direct review
of NLRB's unit determination, but indirect challenge is permitted by contesting unfair
labor practice determination).
131. This prohibition was stated not once, but three times, in § 8 of the Indiana statute,
which included the following provisions:
"(d) * * * Provided, however, that the determination by the board that an
employee organization has been chosen by a majority of the employees in an ap-
propriate unit may not be subject to review by the court.
(g) . . . the certification by the board that an employees' organization is the
exclusive representative shall not be subject to review by the court.
(i) In any proceeding for enforcement or review of a board order held pursuant
to section 8(d) or (g) of this chapter, evidence introduced during the representa-
tion proceeding pursuant to section 7 of this chapter [on representation and col-
lective bargaining units] shall not be included in the transcript of the record re-
quired to be filed under subsection 8(d) or (g); nor shall the court consider the
record of such proceeding."
Indiana Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community School Corp,, 266 Ind.
491, 501-02, 365 N.E.2d 752, 757 (1977).
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labor practice proceedings, any evidence on unit determinations. 32
This provision was in contrast to the NLRA, which specifically pro-
vides that such evidence shall be included in the record for review
of unfair labor practice decisions. 133
Ohio's prohibition against judicial review is placed in the Act's
bargaining unit determination section. No such language appears
in the provisions governing unfair labor practice proceedings. And
while the Act specifically does not order inclusion of unit determina-
tion evidence in the transcript, as does the NLRA, neither does it
specifically exclude it, as did the Indiana statute. The absence of
a specific exclusion facilitates inclusion of the evidence as part of
the record on appeal. The Act provides that, upon appeal of an
order by a party or a petition by the SERB for enforcement, the
SERB shall certify and file with the court "a transcript of the entire
record in the proceeding, including the pleadings and evidence upon
which the order was entered and the findings and order of the
Board. "134
Under the Ohio statute, then, collateral appeal of unit determina-
tions appears available. By refusing to bargain, an aggrieved party
assures itself of an unfair labor practice charge and of a resulting
bargaining order on conclusion of the unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings. This order will then be subject to court review as would
any other unfair labor practice determination. This availability of
collateral review satisfies the requirements of procedural due
process. 135
This analysis, which is based on an analogy to the federal pro-
cedure for collateral review, is problematical in that the Ohio Act
unequivocally characterizes the SERB's unit determinations as "final
and conclusive." Under the NLRA, however, unit determinations
are not considered "final" agency actions and thus are not reviewable
132. See supra note 131 fbr the text of the statute.
133. 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976) states:
Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 160(c) of this title
is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation pur-
suant to subsection (c) of this section and there is a petition for the enforcement
or review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation
shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under
subsection (e) or (f) of section 160 of this title, and thereupon the decree of the
court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the
Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings
set forth in such transcript.
134. 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-242 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHio REV. CODE
4117.13(A)).
135. See American Fed. of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411-12 (1940).
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until after a bargaining order has been issued. One could argue that
the Ohio General Assembly, with full knowledge of the NLRA and
the interpretation thereof, sought to make a change from federal
law by labeling SERB unit determinations as "final" instead of
interlocutory.
Any such attribution to the legislature should be rejected. A more
plausible interpretation of the law is that the drafters, by labeling
determinations final and not reviewable, meant only to guard against
piecemeal attacks of bargaining proceedings. Permitting a party to
challenge a unit determination, or other order, before an election
undeniably would impede the quest for industrial peace, as pre-
NLRA federal experience demonstrates. 13 6 Thus, that a prohibi-
tion against direct judicial review was all that was intended is a
reasonable construction of the law. Moreover, had the General
Assembly intended to prohibit collateral review, it presumably would
have said so. Such a prohibition, if intended, easily could have been
inserted into the unfair labor practice sections. Instead, the Act con-
tains no exception to court review of the entire record of unfair labor
practice determinations, including bargaining orders.
Given that the Act can be construed to prohibit only direct, while
permitting collateral, judicial review, no constitutional problem ex-
ists. Therefore, an attack based on the SERB's authority to make
final bargaining unit determinations should fail.
VI. HOME RULE
The establishment of wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment and decisions pertaining to hiring, promotion,
retention, discipline and dismissal of employees are fundamental
aspects of local government."3 7 Because the Act contemplates broad
state regulation of these processes, challenges based on the home
rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution are likely.'
38
A. The Parameters of Home Rule in Ohio
Prior to 1912, municipal corporations 139 in Ohio looked exclusively
136. See id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6).
137. See infra notes 170, 172-85 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 2.
139. The Ohio Constitution classifies all municipal corporations as either "cities"
(municipal corporations "having a population of five thousand or more") or "villages"
("all other. . . municipal corporations"). OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. In Ohio, "home
rule powers are granted to all municipalities alike, regardless of size." Fordham & Asher,
Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 18, 19 (1948). Therefore, this discussion
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to the state legislature for their powers.1 40 The General Assembly
historically had been miserly in dispensing authority to
municipalities, 14 1 and the resulting political pressures led to a "cry
for a constitutional change. "1 42 With the adoption of the home rule
amendment in 1912, municipalities acquired substantial autonomy
over their own affairs. 143
Section 3 of the amendment, which provides the focus of any home
rule-based attack on the public employee bargaining statute, directs:
"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in
conflict with general laws.' 44 The drafters of this provision sought
to define clearly the boundaries of municipal home rule. 145 They
carefully chose the term "local self-government" rather than
"municipal affairs," believing it would demarcate better the
parameters of home rule. 146 Regrettably, "as a legal concept, 'local
of home rule does not distinguish between cities and villages. Possible conflicts between
the public bargaining law and the home rule provisions will not concern villages, however,
because they are excluded from the Act's coverage. See Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-238 (Baldwin)
(to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.01(B)).
140. "Municipalities [before 1912] were .. .largely a political football for each suc-
ceeding Legislature, and there was neither stability of law, touching municipal power,
nor sufficient elasticity of law to meet changed and changing municipal conditions." Village
ofPerrysburgv. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 255, 140 N.E. 595, 598 (1923). See generally
G. VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO (1st ed. 1978) (exhaustively discussing
historical evolution and modern application of home rule in the state).
141. See generally Walker, Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 OHIO ST. L. J.
1, 2-13 (1948) (describing the slow progression of local government growth in Ohio).
142. G. VAUBEL, supra note 140, at 13.
143. See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII.
144. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. Ohio does not provide a similar grant of home
rule for its counties. Article X, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, however, does permit
municipalities and townships, "with the consent of the county, to transfer to the county
any of their powers or to revoke the transfer of any such power." OHIO CONST. art. X,
§ 1. See also Fordham & Asher, supra note 139, at 21 n.12 ("[C]ounty home rule is a
dead letter in Ohio.").
145. The objective was
to draw as sharply and as clearly as possible the line that separates general affairs
from the business which is peculiar to each separate municipality ... to draw
... a line between those two things and to leave the power of the state as broad
hereafter with reference to general affairs as it has ever been, and to have the
power of the municipalities on the other hand as complete as they can be made
with reference to those things which concern the municipalities alone, always keep-
ing in mind the avoidance of conflict between the two as far as possible.
2 OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL COVENTION, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 1433 (1913) [hereinafter
cited as OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]; see also G. VAUBEL, supra note 140, at 13-15.
146. 2 OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 145, at 1485, 1488; see also Ford-
ham & Asher, supra note 139, at 25.
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self-government' is as lacking in sharpness of meaning after . . .
years of interpretation as it was at the outset. ''147
Notwithstanding the imprecise distinction between the state's
"general affairs" and "business . . . peculiar to each separate
municipality" 148 or, alternatively, between "local self-government"
and "municipal affairs," the scope of home rule is not completely
uncertain. Section 3 of the home rule amendment concludes with
the words "as are not in conflict with general laws."1 49 State ex rel.
Canada v. Phillips addressed whether this limiting language applies
to all or only a portion of the powers conferred on municipalities
by section 3.150 The court decided that municipalities' "authority
to exercise all powers of local self-government" is not subject to
the limiting language; rather, only the power "to adopt and en-
force . . . local police, sanitary and other similar regulations' ' 151
is subordinate to conflicting state laws. 152
In so finding, the court reaffirmed its observations, made a decade
after passage of the home rule amendment, that in the amendment
147. Fordham & Asher, supra note 139, at 25; see infra note 165.
148. See supra note 145.
149. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. "General" laws involve:
[T]he concern of the state for the peace, health and safety of all of its people,
wholly separate and distinct from, and without reference to, any of its political
subdivisions-such as those which regulate the morals of people, the purity of
their food, the protection of the streams, the safety of buildings and similar matters.
Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 359, 103 N.E. 512, 518 (1913). See
generally G. VAUBEL, supra note 140, at 50-52 (advancing theory that constitutional con-
vention debates regarding meaning of "general law" are susceptible to several
interpretations).
150. 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
151. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
152. 168 Ohio St. at 197, 151 N.E.2d at 727. In State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, the Supreme
Court of Ohio elaborated on its holding in Canada:
The controversy concerns whether the . . . phrase. "as are not in conflict
with general laws" . . . modifies all that has gone before it in Section 3, or only the
portion dealing with the adoption and enforcement within the municipality's limits
of "local police, sanitary and other similar regulations." It is argued that the modi-
fying phrase applies not to this portion alone'but to the opening phrase (dealing
with "all powers of local self-government") as well because the framers of the Con-
stitution knowingly refused to separate the phrases designating the two classifica-
tions of functions by a comma (2 Ohio Constitutional Convention, Proceedings
and Debates [1912], 1860 to 1861). While the insertion of the comma would have
been proof positive of an intent to have the modifier apply to the second phrase
only, the converse does not necessarily follow, and this court has chosen to read
the section as it would have had a comma been inserted after the word,
"self-government."
170 Ohio St. 297, 300-01, 164 N.E.2d 574, 577 (1960). Various commentators have urged
that this construction of section 3 finds, at best, scant support in the legislative history.
G. VAUBEL, supra note 140, at 49-50; Fordham & Asher, supra note 139, at 22-25.
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"the sovereign people of the state expressly delegated to the sovereign
people of the municipalities of the state full and complete political power
in all matters of 'local self-government. ' "113 Furthermore, Canada recog-
nized that a municipal enactment truly must implicate the state's
police, health and welfare powers before the limiting language will
come into play: "Of course, the mere fact that the exercise of a power
of local self-government may happen to relate to the police depart-
ment does not make it a police regulation within the meaning of
the words 'police .. .regulations' found in [section 3]."1154 Clearly,
then, if a substantive matter pertains to "local self-government"
and is not limited by "other constitutional provisions," 155 munici-
palities reign supreme.
A second tenet of Ohio home rule is that the grant of substantive
home rule power is not dependent upon the exercise of a municipal-
ity's option under the Ohio Constitution to adopt a charter.156 Both
153. Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 255, 140 N.E. 595, 598
(1923) (emphasis added).
154. 168 Ohio St. at 197, 151 N.E.2d at 727-28. Canada of course, does not, stand
for the proposition that municipalities are precluded from legislating in the areas of police
powers or public health and welfare, nor have later decisions so held. To the contrary:
[Section 3 of article XVIII], adopted in 1912, preserved the supremacy of the
state in matters of "police, sanitary and other similar regulations," while granting
municipalities sovereignty in matters of local self-government, limited only by other
constitutional provisions. Municipalities may enact police and similar regulations
under their powers of local self-government, but such regulations "must yield to
general laws of statewide scope and application, and statutory enactments repre-
senting the general exercise of police power by the state prevail over police and
similar regulations [adopted] in the exercise by a municipality of the powers of
local self-government."
City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 65, 337 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1975) (quoting
State ex rel. Klapp v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 14, 17, 225 N.E.2d
230, 233 (1967)), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 956 (1976).
Although in their exercise of "powers of local self-government" municipalities need
not be concerned with conflicting "general laws," the above-quoted language from City
of Canton instructs that municipal sovereignty in matters of local self-government is sub-
ject to "other constitutional provisions." 44 Ohio St. 2d at 65, 337 N.E.2d at 769. One
such provision is article II, section 34: "Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the
hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort, health, safety
and general welfare of all employees; and no other provision of the constitution shall im-
pair or limit this power." OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34. See Wray v. City or Urbana, 2
Ohio App. 3d 172, 440 N.E.2d 1382 (1982) (Ohio's Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act
applies to municipal employees, despite conflicting local ordinance).
155. See supra note 154; see also Duffey, Non-Charter Municipalities: Local Self-Government,
21 OHIo ST. L.J. 304, 314 (1960) ("[wlhile local police regulations were subject to statutory
control under the conflict clause, the non-police powers were superior to conflicting state
statutes unless state power was found in a specific constitutional provision").
156. OHIO CO NST. art. XVIII, § 7 reads: "Any municipality may frame and adopt or
amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of
this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government."
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chartered and non-chartered municipalities enjoy the full range of
substantive home rule authority.1 57 Municipal power emanates,
courts have theorized, from article XVIII, section 3 and not from
a charter, the function of the latter being merely to distribute power
conferred by section 3 rather than to provide an additional source
of authority. 5 8
Although a municipality's authority to enact substantive legisla-
tion is unaffected by the presence or absence of a charter, its pro-
cedural home rule power is affected. The Ohio Constitution offers
two means for the exercise of section 3 home rule power to enact
substantive measures. The first is to "frame and adopt . . . a
charter." 15 9 The second, applicable to non-chartered municipalities,
157. "It is axiomatic that an ordinance [involving local self-government], if enacted
by a chartered municipality, would prevail over ... state law irrespective of any conflict.
• . . A non-chartered municipality [also] may enact an ordinance which is at variance
with state law in matters of substantive local self-government." Northern Ohio Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Parma, 61 Ohio St. 2d 375; 378, 402 N.E.2d 519, 521-22
(1980). This principle has not been always beyond doubt. In a decision immediately follow-
ing the passage of the home rule amendment, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared that
the adoption of a charter was a prerequisite for upholding an ordinance at variance with
a state statute. State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 93-95, 102 N.E. 670, 672-73
(1913). Scarcely ten years later, in Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, the court rejected Lynch,
holding that "[t]he grant of power in Section 3, Article XVIII, [applies] equally to
municipalities that do adopt a charter as well as those that do not adopt a charter." 108
Ohio St. 245, 245, 140 N.E. 595, 595 (1923) (syllabus 5). Despite this unequivocal
pronouncement, the court, in its own charitable description of its vacillation, subsequently
"los[t] the perspective of the Perrysburg decision and resort[ed] to the analysis of the
discredited Lynch . . . decision." City of Parna, 61 Ohio St. 2d at 382, 402 N.E.2d at
524 (referring to State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E.2d 574 (1960),
and Leavers v. Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33, 203 N.E.2d 354 (1964)).
158.
But what is a city charter but a city constitution, and a city constitution can in
no wise enlarge the municipal power granted in the state Constitution. After all,
it only distributes that power to the different agencies of government, and in that
distribution may place such limitation, but not enlargement, upon that power,
as the people of the municipality may see fit in such charter or constitution. The
city charter in no wise affecting the degree of municipal power of the state Con-
stitution, its optional adoption under the language of [Section 7 of] the Constitu-
tion should in no wise affect the operation of Section 3, Article XVIII ....
Moreover, the language of Section 7 is merely "may" adopt a charter.
Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 253, 140 N.E. 595, 597 (1923);
accord Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Parma, 61 Ohio St. 2d
375, 380-81, 402 N.E.2d 519, 523 (1980); see also Duffey, supra note 155, at 314 ("[s]ince
municipal power [is] derived directly from Section 3, the only significance of a charter
[is] . . . the ability to establish a form of government and . . . the ability to place limita-
tions on section 3 powers by charter provision").
159. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7. See supra note 156 for the text of the section. OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 701.05 (Page 1976) gives chartered municipal corporations the option
of passing legislation either in conformance with the charter procedures or according to
methods prescribed by state statute.
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is to conform to laws passed by the General Assembly "for the in-
corporation and government of cities and villages."160 In instituting
legislation, therefore, non-chartered municipalities must adhere to
state laws, promulgated pursuant to article XVIII, section 2,
prescribing procedures for enacting particular substantive
ordinances. 161 Apparently there are no statutes specifying procedures
for enacting ordinances governing wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment for public employees. Ohio Revised
Code sections 731.17 through 731.27, however, do establish pro-
cedures of general application "to the passage of ordinances and
resolutions of a municipal corporation. "1 62 These general procedures
presumably would apply to the enactment of ordinances governing
collective bargaining for municipal employees. 163
In sum, municipal corporations-chartered and non-chartered
alike-enjoy unfettered home rule authority to enact substantive
legislation on matters of "local self-government." Only is substan-
tive enactments involve "police, sanitary, and other similar regula-
tions" must they not "conflict with general laws." And state pro-
cedural requirements for enacting substantive legislation prevail over
municipal procedures only where non-chartered municipal corpora-
tions are concerned. With these guidelines in mind, the task of assess-
ing the constitutionality on home rule grounds of Ohio's public
employee bargaining law remains. It is this inquiry to which the
following two sections are directed.
B. Employee Relations and Home Rule in Ohio
As State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips demonstrates, whether Ohio's
160. See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, S 2, which provides: "General laws shall be passed
to provide for the incorporation and government of cities and villages; and additional
laws may also be passed for the government of municipalities adopting the same."
161. See, e.g., Village ofWintersville v. Argo Sales Co., 35 Ohio St. 2d 148, 299 N.E.2d
269 (1973); Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N.E.2d 419 (1954) (both holding
that non-chartered municipalities cannot enact "emergency" zoning ordinances without
complying with OHIO REV. CODE § 713.12, which requires public notice and hearing prior
to passage of zoning ordinances); cf. Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City
of Parma, 61 Ohio St. 2d 375, 383, 402 N.E.2d 519, 524-25 (1980) (ability to determine
salaries for municipal employees of non-chartered community is matter of substantive,
not procedural, local self-government; Wintersville and Morris therefore are inapposite).
162. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 731.17(A) (Page 1976).
163. The procedure-substance distinction for non-chartered municipalities is consis-
tent with judicial pronouncements that municipalities are sovereign in matters of local
self-government "limited only by other constitutional provisions." City of Canton v. Whit-
man, 44 Ohio St. 2d 62, 337 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 956 (1976).
Article XVIII, sections 2 and 7 are "other constitutional provisions" that limit municipalities
in exercising procedural home rule power conferred by article XVIII, section 3.
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public employee bargaining law will prevail over conflicting
municipal ordinances will depend on whether the legislation is
deemed to encroach on powers of local self-government. 164 While
generalizations in this area are difficult to make, 165 the Ohio courts
have characterized most aspects of employee relations as purely local
in nature, and state laws seeking to regulate these employment
related matters thus have been held in conflict with the home rule
amendment. 166 Because the Act attempts to govern fundamental
areas of employment relations, a similar fate is foreshadowed, to
a degree, by the pertinent Ohio case law.
The aspect of the Act most likely to provoke a constitutional
challenge on home rule grounds is, again, the binding arbitration
provision of the statute. 167 These provisions empower an ad hoc ar-
bitrator, rather than a municipality, to set wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment for certain public health and
safety employees. 168 Because the municipality's funding powers, as
well as its power to govern employment conditions, are impinged
by this section, serious home rule concerns are implicated. 169
Indeed, these concerns may prove sufficient to void the statute
164. See infra note 192 for a discussion of whether home rule concerns exist in the absence
of a conflicting municipal ordinance.
165. That the law in Ohio on home rule historically has been less than clear is illustrated
by the decision in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722
(1958). In Canada, the court overruled an entire line of home rule cases, noting " 'it is
not surprising . . . that, with the changing personnel of the court during the 44 years
these provisions [sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII] have been in effect, it has been no
easy task to maintain something even remotely resembling consistency.' " Id. at 198, 151
N.E.2d at 728 (quoting State ex rel. Lynch v. City of Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132
N.E.2d 118 (1956)).
166. An exception has been carved out for state laws dealing with hours of work and
minimum wages, an exception mandated by article II, section 34 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion. See supra note 154 for the text of this constitutional provision. See also Wray v. City
of Urbana, 2 Ohio App. 3d 172, 440 N.E.2d 1382 (1982) (Ohio's Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act, enacted pursuant to section 34, was found to prevail over local ordinance
despite home rule provision).
167. Home rule challenges to public employee bargaining laws in other states have
focused on binding arbitration provisions. See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes'49-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the binding ar-
bitration provisions. The scope of an arbitrator's power, moreover, theoretically ranges
beyond wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. See supra notes 106-08
and accompanying text.
169. The binding arbitration sections are by no means the only provisions subject to
attack on home rule grounds. See, e.g., City of Hermiston v. Employment Relations Bd.,
27 Or. App. 755, 557 P.2d 681 (1976), rev'don other grounds, 280 Or. 291, 570 P.2d 663
(1977), in which the entire bargaining statute was alleged to infringe on home rule. But
while other provisions of the Ohio Act also may be challenged as violative of home rule,
it is binding arbitration that presents the greatest threat to municipal autonomy.
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in the face of a conflicting local law. The right to set wages and
the right to determine the qualifications for and conditions of employ-
ment repeatedly have been held to be matters of substantive local
self-government. 170 As such, the courts have held, they are immune
from regulation by the state.
In so holding, the Ohio courts have been forced to decide whether
the particular ordinance at issue and the corresponding aspects of
employment it seeks to regulate involve a power of purely local self-
government, as opposed to a power of general, or statewide,
concern.17' The two, of necessity, are mutually exclusive. While both
municipal and state interests may overlap in many areas, only one
interest may be deemed predominant in the face of a conflict. And
it is the municipality's interest that has been held superior in the
context of employee wages. As was recently stated in Northern Ohio
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of Parma, "it has been firmly
established that the ability to determine the salaries paid to city
employees is a fundamental power of local self-government." 172 That
170. See, e.g., Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Parma, 61 Ohio
St. 2d 375, 402 N.E.2d 519 (1980); State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191,
151 N.E.2d 722 (1958); Craig v. City of Youngstown, 162 Ohio St. 215, 123 N.E.2d
19 (1954); Harsney v. Allen, 160 Ohio St. 36, 113 N.E.2d 86 (1953); Mullen v. Akron,
116 Ohio App. 417, 188 N.E.2d 607 (1962); City of Cleveland ex rel. Kay v. Riebe, 46
Ohio Misc. 47, 348 N.E.2d 156 (1975); see also Harbarger v. Ballard, 53 Ohio App. 2d
281, 373 N.E.2d 390 (1977). But see Wray v. City of Urbana, 2 Ohio App. 3d 172, 440
N.E.2d 1382 (1982) (state minimum wage and overtime law prevails over conflicting
ordinance).
171. See supra note 149 for the constitutional description of "general laws."
172. 61 Ohio St. 2d 375, 383, 402 N.E.2d 519, 525 (1980). In City of Parma, a state
statute mandating full pay for employees on a military leave of absence was held inap-
plicable to Parma, in view of a conflicting city ordinance. Parma had enacted a law that
required the city to pay an employee on military leave only the difference between his
salary and his military pay, rather than his full salary. The court rejected the police of-
ficers' contention that the state law should prevail. Id. at 377, 402 N.E.2d at 521.
In so doing, the court found the wages to be paid to employees to be a matter of substan-
tive local self-government and further reasoned that salaries paid to city employees in
the armed forces was not a statewide concern. Id. at 383, 402 N.E.2d at 524-25. The
court also noted that " '[tihe mere fact that the exercise of a power of local self-government
may happen to relate to the police department does not make it a police regulation within
the meaning of the words "police regulations" found in Section 3 of Article XVIII of
the Constitution.' "Id. at 383, 402 N.E.2d at 525 (quoting State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips,
168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958)); see also Mullen v. Akron, 116 Ohio App. 417,
188 N.E.2d 607 (1962) (city ordinance prevails over state military pay law).
Troublesome is the City of Parina court's further statement that the state's concern was
"not sufficient" to interfere with municipalities' wage decisions. 61 Ohio St. 2d at 383,
402 N.E.2d at 525. This remark suggests that a state interest could be sufficiently great
as to override this local concern, a notion.in conflict with the court's holding that municipal
wages involve a "fundamental power of local self government." It is hard to conceive
that an issue "fundamentally local" could so affect the general public as to render it a matter
of statewide interest.
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the fiscal decision centers around the municipality's own employees
makes it perhaps more "purely local" than other city expenditures.
Comparison of the Supreme Court of Ohio's ruling in State ex
rel. Evans v. Moore,17 3 with its decision in Craig v. City of Youngstown, '7 4
demonstrates this conclusion. In Moore, the court held Ohio's
prevailing wage law preempted a conflicting local ordinance, find-
ing the state law to be an exercise of the state's police power on
a matter of statewide concern. 7 5 At issue in Moore was the city's
conflicting ordinance providing that city contracts would not be re-
quired to comply with the prevailing wage law. This ordinance was
struck down. 17 6
In Moore, however, the employees involved were those of private
contractors rather than city employees.' 77 The importance of this
factor is evidenced by the court's contrasting holding in Craig, in
which the prevailing wage law was held inapplicable to the
municipality in view of a conflicting city ordinance. Importantly,
though, the employees considered in Craig were the municipality's
own employees. In upholding the ordinance under the home rule
amendment, the court stated that "[tlo sustain the plaintiff's con-
tention . . . would be to substitute a determination of the rates of
pay by negotiation between labor unions and other employers for
a determination by the council of the municipality." 1 7 8 Constitu-
tionally, such a result could not be tolerated.
As correctly noted by the dissent in Moore, the only distinguishing
factor between the majority and Craig was the municipal employee
status of the workers. 179 The three dissenting justices in Moore would
have extended Craig to nonemployees, on the basis that any fiscal
decision "involves a central power of self-goverment-the power
of the purse."' 80 Recognizing that section 3 of article XVIII
guarantees to municipalities all powers of local self-government, they
found that "[n]othing is more germane to effective self-government
than the power to determine the nature, kind, and extent of
municipal expenditures. "181
173. 69 Ohio St. 2d 88, 431 N.E.2d 311 (1982).
174. 162 Ohio St. 215, 123 N.E.2d 19 (1954).
175. 69 Ohio St. 2d at 91-92, 431 N.E.2d at 313-14. The prevailing wage law requires
that all contractors and subcontractors for public improvements pay wages not less than
those paid, pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, to laborers and construction
workers in the locality. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4115.03-.15 (Page 1980).
176. 69 Ohio St. 2d at 91-92, 431 N.E.2d at 313-14.
177. Id. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 316 (Locher, J., dissenting).
178. 162 Ohio St. at 220, 123 N.E.2d at 22.
179. 69 Ohio St. 2d at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 316 (Locher, J., dissenting).
180. Id., 431 N.E.2d at 316 (Locher, J., dissenting).
181. Id., 431 N.E.2d at 316 (Locher, J., dissenting).
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Notwithstanding the logic of this reasoning, Craig and Moore
clearly establish that when the fiscal decision involves employee wages,
it is of such fundamental local concern as to brook no state
interference. 182 The municipal ordinance will be upheld over a con-
flicting state law, as a purely local power is involved.
Other employment related concerns apart from wages similarly
have been held purely local. Decisions including the transfer of
employees,183 the qualifications for municipal employment 18 4 and
the appointment or hiring of employees 18 5 all have been deemed
powers of local self-government.
182. See also State ex rel. Mullin v. Mansfield, 26 Ohio St. 2d 129, 132, 269 N.E.2d
602, 604 ("The powers of the city council of a noncharter city to establish the number
of employees to be employed in any city department and the pay scale classification of
such employees is a basic and fundamental power of local government."), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 985 (1971).
Wray v. City of Urbana, 2 Ohio App. 3d 172, 440 N.E.2d 1382 (1982), is not to the
contrary. While Wray held the state's Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act preempted
a conflicting local ordinance, it did so in reliance, at least in part, on article II, section
34, of the Ohio Constitution. This provision explicitly gives the state predominance in
minimum wage and hour laws. See supra note 154. The Wray court noted that "the power
to determine wages paid city employees is a power of local self government." 2 Ohio App.
3d at 172, 440 N.E.2d at 1383. But because the particular wage statute fell squarely within
article II, section 34, it superseded any local law, despite the home rule amendment. Id.,
440 N.E.2d at 1383.
183. See, e.g., Harsney v. Allen, 160 Ohio St. 36, 113 N.E. 2d 86 (1953) (chief of police's
right under local ordinance to transfer officer prevailed over conflicting state law). "The
organization and regulation of its police force, as well as its civil service functions, are
within a municipality's powers of local self-government." Id. at 41, 113 N.E.2d at 88.
184. See, e.g., City of Cleveland ex rel. Kay v. Riebe, 46 Ohio Misc. 47, 348 N.E.2d
156 (1975) (city ordinance not requiring residency upheld over purportedly conflicting
state law). "[T]he city of Cleveland [has] exclusive control over establishing the qualifica-
tions of its officers and employees. Any statute which is not is, accord with the constitu-
tional provisions and the charter is not applicable." Id. at 49, 348 N.E.2d at 159; see also
State ex rel. Frankenstein v. Hillenbrand, 100 Ohio St. 339, 126 N.E. 309 (1919) (municipal
charter provisions concerning selection of municipal officers prevails over conflicting state
law). "[T]he manner of selecting purely municipal officers is a subject of 'local self-
government,' as distinguished from 'local police, sanitary and other similar regulations.'
Id. at 345, 126 N.E. at 310.
185. State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958) (state
civil service laws inapplicable to city with conflicting ordinance); see also State ex rel. Lynch
v. City of Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E,2d 118 (1956) (municipality's procedure
for promoting police officers prevailed over state's civil service law); State ex rel. Lentz
v. Edwards, 90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914) (regulating civil service of city is mat-
ter of municipal concern).
In Canada, involving the appointment of a police officer, the court recognized the state
interest in effective police protection but noted that it did not justify state interference
with the municipality's employment practices.
It is undoubtedly true that the enforcement of laws by police in every part of
the state is a matter of "state-wide concern." Undoubtedly the state has power
to provide for police in every part of the state to enforce its laws .... However,
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While the above illustrates that many employment related issues
have been held fundamentally local, not all aspects of employment
have been characterized as such. It has been suggested that State
ex rel. Canada v. Phillips separates employment powers into two
groups: those involving position and tenure are local, while those
involving employee welfare are police powers and thus are of general
or statewide interest.18 6
Moreover, if a power implicates employee welfare, it not only
will fall within the "police power" language of section 3 of article
XVIII, which permits municipalities to legislate only so long as no
conflict with the general laws exist, 187 but it also will fall within sec-
tion 34 of article II, which allows the state to legislate for the "general
welfare of all employees."' 188 But to tag a law with the "general
welfare" label, the court must consider the subject matter of suffi-
cient statewide concern as to prevail over any competing local
interest.
This it rarely has done. 18 9 Keeping in mind that most wage issues
and many "terms and conditions" of employment issues have been
regarded as purely local by the Ohio courts, it is apparent that
"general welfare" has been and will be construed narrowly. This
where a municipality establishes and operates a police department, it may do so
as an exercise of the powers of local self-government conferred upon it by Sec-
tions 3 and 7 of Article XVIII of the Constitution. If it does, the mere interest
or concern of the state, which may justify the state in providing similar police
protection, will not justify the state's interference with such exercise by municipality
of its powers of local self-government.
168 Ohio St. at 200, 151 N.E.2d at 729. This language strongly suggests that the state's
interest in effective law enforcement, of itself, will be insufficient to impose an employ-
ment relations law-binding arbitration for public safety forces-on municipalities. Some
greater interest will need to be shown. See infra notes 196-207 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the balancing of interests in the public employee bargaining context.
186. See G. VAUBEL, supra note 140, at 462. Professor Vaubel points to Markowski
v. Backstrom, 10 Ohio Misc. 139, 226 N.E.2d 825 (1967), which held the Ferguson Act
applicable to municipal employees in spite of a conflicting local law, as an example of
state power to override local power in the employment relations area. G. VAUBEL, supra
note 140, at 561-62. In Markowski, however, no "issue of constitutionality" was raised
and the court expressly refrained from ruling on any constitutional questions. 10 Ohio
Misc. at 144, 226 N.E.2d at 828. Thus, home rule implications were neither considered
nor decided by the court.
187. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 153; see also G. VAUBEL, supra note 140, at 462-63. For example,
in State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees v. Board of Trustees of Police Relief, a municipality was ordered
to transfer the assets of its police relief and pension fund to the state pension fund. The
state pension fund legislation was deemed, without much discussion, to be a general welfare
law and thus within article II, section 34. 12 Ohio St. 2d 105, 106-07, 233 N.E.2d 135,
137 (1967).
189. See G. VAUBEL, supra note 140, at 462-63.
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restricted interpretation bodes ill for the Act, for its application to
a municipality will be upheld only if the law is found to be a general
welfare law of predominantly state, rather than local, concern.
C. Home Rule-Based Challenges to Public Bargaining Laws in Other
Jurisdictions
As the foregoing establishes, municipal corporations in Ohio can
enact substantive legislation involving matters of "local self-
government" despite conflicting state laws. 190 Ohio courts, with near
uniformity, have treated a variety of terms and conditions of public
employment as concerns of "local self-government" and not as
"police, sanitary and other similar regulations" that may not con-
flict with state law. 191 It is submitted that Ohio courts, when faced
with home rule-based attacks on the Act, will extend this deference
to local power and declare the Act to be an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on home rule authority.' 92
190. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
192. Whether a municipality will be subject to the Act if it does not already have in
place, or subsequently enact, a public bargaining ordinance that conflicts with the state
law is unsettled. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, after holding
that laws for appointments and promotions in municipal police departments promulgated
by the General Assembly under article XV, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution do not
supplant conflicting local legislation, remarked in dictum:
[S]uch laws may be applicable . . . where a city has failed to enact charter or legislative
provisions on the subject covered by the statutes and the statutes do not conflict with any charter
or municipal legislative provisions or where a city has in its charter expressly adopted
the state statutes.
168 Ohio St. 191, 195, 151 N.E.2d 722, 726 (1958) (emphasis added). The only out-of-
state decision expressly to acknowledge this issue is inconclusive. In City of Roseburg
v. Roseburg City Firefighters Local 1489, 639 P.2d 90 (Or. 1981), a conflicting ordinance
had been enacted. The court, citing the "plenary authority" shared by both the city and
state to enact public bargaining legislation, noted with approval the city's concession that,
absent the local legislation, it would have had to comply with the state bargaining statute
because the latter, "standing alone, would be constitutional . . . under the home rule
amendments." 639 P.2d at 95. One of the concurring justices, however, urged the issue
should not be conceded so readily; "Arguably any given city's constitutional immunity
from a state law should not depend on its formal political decision to enact a conflicting
law, although a contrary argument also is possible." 639 P.2d at 104 (Linde, J., concurring).
By entertaining home rule-based challenges where no conflicting local legislation ap-
parently existed, other out-of-state cases involving home rule-based disputes implicitly
have adopted the suggestions of Canada and the Roseburg majority. See, e.g., Town of Ar-
lington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976);
Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d
226 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d
404 (1975); City of Everett v. Fire Fighters Local 350, 87 Wash. 2d 572, 555 P.2d 418
(1976).
Nothwithstanding the above-quoted dictum from State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, this
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Decisions from other jurisdictions frequently have involved un-
successful challenges to binding arbitration provisions in the state
statute and, for the most part, are not instructive because the respec-
tive home rule provisions are narrower than Ohio's.1 93 Some cases
have presented challenges to the entire state bargaining law but either
have used a distinguishable home rule test' 94 or have employed a
discredited and impractical analysis. 195
assumption may not be viable given the language in Ohio's home rule amendment. If
the decision to bargain collectively or not to bargain collectively is exclusively a matter
of local self-government, it arguably remains so whether or not a municipality legislates
on the subject. If, on the other hand, municipalities share their powers of local self-
government with the state until they take substantive affirmative legislative action that
conflicts with state law, then the dictum in Canada is accurate.
In any event, it is beyond dispute that the absence of conflicting local legislation will
not deprive municipalities of standing to mount a constitutional challenge to the state
public bargaining law. Municipalities may institute proceedings to obtain a declaratory
judgment that the law is unconstitutional. See, e.g., City of Reno v. Reno Police Protec-
tion Ass'n, 653 P.2d 156 (Nev. 1982); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19,
332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); City of Everett v. Fire Fighters Local 350,
87 Wash. 2d 572, 555 P.2d 418 (1976). Injunctive relief also may be sought. See, e.g.,
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975);
City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969).
193. See Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769,
773, 352 N.E.2d 914, 918 (1976) (home rule amendment limits all municipal power to
acts "not inconsistent with"_general laws; unlike Ohio, municipalities have no sovereignty
over matters of local self-government); Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local 412 v. City
of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 244, 231 N.W.2d 226, 229-30 (1975) (home rule amend-
ment subject to constitutional provision expressly empowering legislature to "enact laws
providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees"); City of Amster-
dam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 26, 332 N.E.2d 290, 295-96, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 411 (1975)
(local government can adopt local laws only to extent "not inconsistent with . . . any
general law"); City of Everett v. Fire Fighters Local 350, 87 Wash. 2d 572, 594, 555
P.2d 418, 419 (1976) (home rule amendment insulates municipalities only against "special
laws" and subjects them to "general laws").
194. See, e.g., City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Firefighters Local 1489, 292 Or.
266, 639 P.2d 90 (1981) (home rule amendment granted preeminence to municipal govern-
ments only in procedural matters, such as local political structure and organization, but
not in matters of substantive law, such as collective bargaining). By contrast, Ohio
municipalities are sovereign over all substantive matters of local self-government and,
if chartered, over all procedural matters of local self-government as well. See supra notes
150-63 and accompanying text.
195. See City of Beaverton v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local 1660, 20 Or.
App. 293, 531 P.2d 730 (1975), overruled by City of Hermiston v. Employment Relations
Bd., 27 Or. App. 755, 557 P.2d 681 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 280 Or. 291, 570 P.2d
663 (1977). City of Beaverton held the Oregon legislature violated principles of home rule
by statutorily declaring the state bargaining law to be preeminent per se over any conflict-
ing charter or ordinance. Home rule, the court reasoned, required that local legislation
be examined section-by-section and that only those provisions governing matters of
predominantly statewide concern which conflict with the state bargaining statute be in-
validated. 20 Or. at 307-08, 531 P.2d at 736-77. In Hermiston, the court found the City
of Beaverton approach ill-advised because both the state statute and the local ordinance
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One case is helpful, however, in predicting Ohio judicial response
to a charge that the Act violates the home rule amendment. In City
of Hermiston v. Employment Relations Board, the city claimed Oregon's
home rule amendment mandated that a local public employee rela-
tions ordinance prevail over a conflicting state law. 196 Just as the
test in Ohio is whether a matter is one of "local self-government,"
in which case the municipality is sovereign, or involves "police,
sanitary or other regulations," in which case municipal enactments
must not conflict with state law, the test applied in Hermiston was
whether local or state interests "predominated" in the area of public
employee bargaining. 197
were "comprehensive, integrated whole[s] creating very different employer-employe[e]
relations schemes. It now appears impossible to consider logically specific provisions from
either the statute or ordinance without regard to the whole. Moreover, the end product
of such an effort would probably be an unworkable ordinance/statute hybrid." 27 Or.
App. at 761, 557 P.2d at 684.
196. 27 Or. App. 755, 762-63, 557 P.2d 681, 684-85 (1976), rev'don other grounds, 280
Or. 291, 570 P.2d 663 (1977). The ordinance and the statute contained significant dif-
ferences. The Hermiston ordinance required that a representation petition be supported
by a 50% showing of interest; the state statute required only 30%. Id. at 757 n.2, 758 n.5,
557 P.2d at 681 n.2, 682 n.5. Questions concerning the appropriateness of a unit were
decided by the city manager and city council under the ordinance and by the state board
under the statute. Id. at 757-59, 557 P.2d at 682. Following the election of an employee
organization, the ordinance permitted "consultation" between city and employee represen-
tatives about "wages and related economic benefits;" the parties had a duty to bargain
in good faith about all terms and conditions of employment in the post-election procedures
established by the statute. Such consultation could lead to a non-binding "memorandum
of understanding" or, if no agreement, to "impasse procedures." Under the state-mandated
plan, bargaining either culminated in a binding agreement to be monitored by an impar-
tial tribunal or precipitated mediation, factfinding and binding arbitration. 27 Or. App.
at 758-59, 557 P.2d at 682-83.
197. Id. at 761, 557 P.2d at 684. At the time Hermiston was decided. Oregon used
a "predominant interest" test set forth by the court in State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie:
[T]he legislative assembly does not have the authority to enact a law relating to
city government even though it is of general applicability to all cities in the state
unless the subject matter of the enactment is of general concern to the state as
a whole, that is to say that it is a matter of more than local concern to each of
the municipalities purported to be regulated by the enactment.
231 Or. 473, 479, 373 P.2d 680, 683-84 (1962). Shortly after Hermiston, the Supreme
Court of Oregon substituted a new home rule analysis for the Heinig rationale:
When a statute is addressed to a concern of the state with the structure and pro-
cedures of local agencies, the statute impinges on the powers reserved by the [home
rule] amendments to the citizens of local communities .... Conversely, a general
law addressed primarily to substantive social, economic, or other regulatory objectives of
the state prevails over contrary policies preferred by some local governments if
it is clearly intended to do so, unless the law is shown to be irreconciliable with
the local community's freedom to choose its own political form.
City of La Grande v. Public Employes Retirement Bd., 281 Or. 137, 156, 576 P.2d 1204,
1215 (1978) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added), aff'don rehearing, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d
765 (1978). It was this procedure-substance distinction the court used to uphold a home
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Public employee bargaining was primarily a local concern, the
Hermiston court concluded; therefore, imposing the state statute on
municipalities having conflicting legislation violated home rule. As
the entity that determined staffing needs, fixed compensation, and
authorized hiring, transfers and terminations, the city had an in-
terest "to have control over the formation, performance and termina-
tion of employment contracts, free from interference from outside
sources, such as [the state board], who may not know of, for exam-
ple, the city's peculiar fiscal situation." 198
The court found the state's purported interest "virtually
non-existent." 199 While state control over public employment rela-
tionships might boost employee morale and efficiency, this interest
did not, the court urged, predominate over local interests.200 Cer-
tainly, the court's summary dismissal of this asserted state interest
is unsatisfactory. But the conclusion nevertheless seems sound,
because, presumably, state employment-related legislation always
seeks to promote employee morale and efficiency. Yet Ohio courts
have upheld home rule-based attacks on a variety of statutes which
sought to confer what the General Assembly evidently deemed
benefits on public employees. 20 1
A state interest in uniformity likewise failed to persuade the Her-
miston court. Calls for uniformity, the court opined, merely
camouflaged claims that the state scheme was "wiser or better than
the local scheme," and such policy considerations are irrelevant to
a home rule analysis which, necessarily, must focus on the constitu-
tion, not policy. 202 Ohio courts similarly have dismissed uniformity
as a basis for depriving communities of their home rule powers. 20 3
With similar dispatch Hermiston rejected the argument that the
state's interest in public employment prevails over the local interest
because of the interdependence of neighboring municipalities and
because municipal employees may be called on to work outside their
own employing community. The court described as "too remote"
rule-based challenge to the Oregon public bargaining law in City of Roseburg v. Roseburg
City Firefighters Local 1489, 292 Or. 266, 639 P.2d 90 (1981).
198. 27 Or. App. at 762, 557 P.2d at 684.
199. Id. at 763, 557 P.2d at 685.
200. Id. at 763, 557 P.2d at 684.
201. See, e.g., Northern Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Parma, 61 Ohio
St. 2d 375, 402 N.E.2d 519 (1980); Craig v. City of Youngstown, 162 Ohio St. 215,
123 N.E.2d 19 (1954).
202. 27 Or. App. at 763, 557 P.2d at 685.
203. See, e.g., State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958).
But see State ex rel. Evans v. Moore, 69 Ohio St. 2d 88, 431 N.E.2d 311 (1982).
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the possibility that non-public health and safety employees would
be summoned from one municipality to another.20 4 In any event,
the court added, "the interdependency point . . .could rapidly be
carried to an extreme that would leave nothing within the exclusive
control of the home rule cities and counties. "205
Thus, to the extent the statute regulated relations between a com-
munity and non-public health and safety employees, the court found
it unconstitutional in its entirety. As to public health and safety
employees, the court reiterated its finding of unconstitutionality
but noted in dictum that the state may be able constitutionally to
prohibit strikes by these employees. The court, however, declined
to reach that question. 20 6
Section 3 of Ohio's home rule amendment and the cases decided
thereunder 20 7 require that municipalities be free of state interference
in substantive matters of local self-government. These same sources
direct that the state is preeminent only in the narrowly-defined sphere
of police, sanitary and other similar general welfare concerns. Of
the home rule challenges to other states' public bargaining laws,
Hermiston most closely resembles the approach Ohio courts can be
expected to follow. If they use such an analysis, a declaration that
the Act violates home rule seems likely.
VII. CONCLUSION
Public employee bargaining has been a protracted controversy
in Ohio. With the enactment of Senate Bill 133, however, the con-
flict is far from over. The arena will simply shift from the floors
of the statehouse to the confines of the courts, where a successful
attack on the statute's validity is anticipated. Because the Act at-
tempts to delegate to an ad hoc arbitrator authority to decide in-
herently political questions, it has crossed the boundaries of per-
missible delegation established by the Ohio courts. And because it
removes from municipalities their substantive power to decide
204. 27 Or. App. at 763, 557 P.2d at 685.
205. Id., 557 P.2d at 685.
206. Id., 557 P.2d at 685. This possible exception for strikes by public health and safety
employees seems, as a practical matter, to be irrelevant. Municipal legislation is unlikely
to permit strikes by such employees. But even if an Ohio municipality enacted an or-
dinance permitting these strikes, that portion of the ordinance seemingly would not be
insulated by the Ohio Constitution. Arguably, the prohibition against strikes by health
and safety employees, designed to promote the security and welfare of the public, is the
type of state "police, sanitary, and other similar regulations" with which local laws must
not conflict under the home rule amendment.
. 207. See supra notes 164-89 and accompanying text.
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employment issues purely local in nature, it violates the home rule
provisions of the state constitution.
Advocation of the Act's invalidity, however, should by no means
be read as a denial of the well-intentioned motives prompting its
enactment. Few can quarrel with the desires of public employees
for a voice in the decisions that affect their working lives. Certainly
whether these desires should be recognized is a policy decision well
within the legislature's discretion. There is no doubt the General
Assembly can promulgate a bargaining bill that would pass con-
stitutional muster. But Senate Bill 133, in its eagerness to embrace
the concept of public sector bargaining, has infringed impermissibly
on constitutional guarantees, safeguards that policy choices must
not be permitted to devitalize.

